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AN INSURRECTION ACT FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY
Thaddeus Hoffmeister*
Better twenty-four hours of riot, damage, and disorder than
illegal use of troops.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Katrina, with 140 mile-per-hour winds, was one of
the deadliest natural disasters to ever strike the United States.2
It impacted more than 93,000 square miles, caused approximately
$100 billion in damage, and displaced more than 770,000 people.3
Worse still, it killed more than 1,300 people, leaving many families devastated.4 For some, the most lasting image or memory of
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1. President Theodore Roosevelt, as quoted in Clayton D. Laurie & Ronald H. Cole,
The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945, at 179 (Ctr. of Military History, U.S. Army 1997).
2. Doyle Rice, USATODAY.com, Hurricane Katrina Stronger than Andrew at Landfall,
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/stormcenter/2005-08-31-Katrina-intensity_x.htm (posted
Aug. 31, 2005, 3:11 p.m. EDT).
3. Frances Fragos Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned 1, 1, 7–8 (U.S. Govt. 2006) (available at http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/
katrinawh.pdf).
4. Id. at 1.
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Hurricane Katrina was the city of New Orleans where the media
televised the daily struggles of the city’s inhabitants.5
One of the harder-hit areas, eighty percent of New Orleans
was underwater as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent levee failures.6 Some of the city’s residents were forced to
seek shelter on their rooftops while they waited—in many
instances for several days—to be rescued.7 Other residents either
fled to the Louisiana Superdome or New Orleans Convention
Center, both of which were ill-equipped to handle the large number of people seeking assistance.8 These shelters of last resort
were woefully understaffed and lacked the basic necessities for
habitability.9 Most notably, they had no running water, electricity, or proper sanitation services, and the available food and
water rations were grossly inadequate.10 The violence and lawlessness found throughout the city and even in some shelters
compounded all of these problems.11 Law enforcement activities,
like other government services, were essentially nonexistent.12
Save for agencies like the Coast Guard, most Americans consider the government’s planning and response to Hurricane
Katrina a failure.13 While Hurricane Katrina eventually resulted
5. Id.
6. Id. at 36.
7. Id. at 38.
8. Id. at 38–39.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 39; see also Robert Travis Scott, Politics Delayed Troops Dispatch to N.O.:
Blanco Resisted Bush Leadership Proposal, Times Picayune [¶ 25] (Dec. 11, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 19945145) (noting that the “Superdome . . . had become an understaffed
and poorly supplied evacuation center with no power or running water.”).
11. Scott R. Tkacz, In Katrina’s Wake: Rethinking the Military’s Role in Domestic
Emergencies, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 301, 304 (2006). Some of the reported levels of
violence were later found to have been exaggerated. Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy Drowned: How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the
Government’s Alibi for the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, 29 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 117, 143–144
(2008) [hereinafter Dougherty, Big Easy Drowned].
12. Tkacz, supra n. 10, at 304.
13. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Prep. for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, H.R. Rpt. 109-377 at 205 (Feb. 15, 2006). “Katrina was a
national failure, an abdication of the most solemn obligation to provide for the common
welfare.” Id. at x. One telling incident of the ineptitude of the federal response was displayed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, who had to be told by National Public Radio
that thousands of people were trapped in the New Orleans Convention Center. CNN, CNN
Reports: Katrina—State of Emergency 70 (Andrews McMeel Publg. 2005). Specifically,
Secretary Chertoff stated: “I have not heard a report of thousands of people in the Convention Center who [do not] have food and water.” Id. Compare, however, a quote attributed to
then White House Deputy Chief of Staff, Karl Rove: “The only mistake we made with
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in the largest domestic deployment of troops since the Civil War,14
many wondered why a country with the most advanced military
the world has ever seen struggled to deliver water to one of its
major cities.15 The answer to this question serves as the thesis for
this Article.
On August 29, 2005, the night of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall
on the Gulf Coast, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco made her
now-famous request to President George W. Bush for “everything
you have got.”16 This request came as Governor Blanco began to
realize she lacked the resources to address the ongoing crisis in
Louisiana. As the situation continued to deteriorate, Governor
Blanco followed up her earlier request to the President by specifically asking for assistance in the form of federal troops.17
Traditionally, state governors and their respective National
Guard units,18 not the federal government, are primarily responsible for handling domestic emergencies because state officials are
both closer to the crisis and generally more familiar with the

Katrina was not overriding the local government.” The Huffington Post, Rove off the
Record on Iraq: Iraq Will Transform the Middle East . . . , http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2005/09/17/rove-off-the-record-on-ir_n_7513.html (posted Sept. 17, 2005, 10:39 p.m.).
14. Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govtl. Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still
Unprepared, Sen. Rpt. 109-322 at 476 (June 1, 2006).
15. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The Daily Transcript, Why We Waited to Send in the Active
Army, http://www.sddt.com/Search/Article.cfm?SourceCode=20050921tzb (posted Sept. 21,
2005). The troops referenced here are active-duty federal forces. Id. National Guard personnel were on the ground and continually arrived. See also Stephen M. Griffin, Stop
Federalism before It Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane Katrina, 21 St. John’s J. Leg.
Comment. 527, 531 (2007) (describing the United States Army and National Guard’s
delayed response to New Orleans due to arguments over jurisdiction and a slowed initial
federal response); Jason Mazzone, The Commandeerer in Chief, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev.
265, 300–301 (2007) [hereinafter Mazzone, Commandeerer] (stating that using dual military forces—the active-duty military and the National Guard—causes delay because of
coordination issues and duplicate efforts).
16. Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to
Prevent the Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating Natural Catastrophe, 26
Miss. C. L. Rev. 107, 114 (2007).
17. Id. at 114.
18. At this point, it would probably be helpful to point out that the National Guard,
unlike the Army or Army Reserves, can either be under the command and control of the
President (Title 10 status) or the governor (Title 32 status). Mazzone, Commandeerer,
supra n. 15, at 288. “Title 10” refers to 10 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), and “Title 32” refers to 32
U.S.C. § 502 (2006). In certain limited exceptions, a member of the National Guard may be
under the command and control of both the President and the governor. Id. When called
up by the President pursuant to the Insurrection Act, the National Guard goes from Title
32 to Title 10 status, and the governor loses his or her control over these forces. Id.
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people impacted than the federal government.19 Moreover, federalism dictates that the “preservation of law and order is
basically a responsibility of the state and local governments.”20
But unlike many past governors in need of federal military aid,
Governor Blanco did not want the federal government to completely take over the relief efforts, nor did she want to lose control
of the Louisiana National Guard—a normal, but not mandatory,
prerequisite for a state seeking federal military aid.21 So, despite
requesting federal military assistance, Governor Blanco did not
ask President Bush to invoke the Insurrection Act.22
The Insurrection Act is the principal authority relied upon by
the President when deploying troops within the United States in
response to a domestic emergency.23 The Act serves as the major
exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA),24 which prohibits
19. Christopher R. Brown, Been There, Doing That in a Title 32 Status: The National
Guard Now Authorized to Perform its 400-Year Old Domestic Mission in Title 32 Status,
2008 Army Law 23, 33–34.
20. Douglas A. Poe, The Use of Federal Troops to Suppress Domestic Violence, 54 ABA
J. 168, 171 (Feb. 1968).
21. Elisabeth Bumiller & Clyde Haberman, Bush Makes a Return Visit; 2 Levees
Secured, N.Y. Times A1 (Sept. 6, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 13994973). Arguably,
active-duty troops could have been placed under Governor Blanco’s command. But this
would have been against one hundred years of precedent, established by President Theodore Roosevelt. President Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Elihu Root, stated that the
President “can[ ]not place [the army] at the disposal of the governor of the State, but must
himself direct their operations . . . .” Commr. of Labor, Labor Disturbances in the State of
Colorado from 1880 to 1904, Inclusive, Sen. Doc. 58-122 at 11 (Jan. 27, 1905). This policy
was probably due to the Governor of Idaho’s misuse of troops during the 1899 Coeur
d’Alene mining dispute. Riot Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 638,
642 n. 33 (1968) [hereinafter Riot Control]. See also Bennett Milton Rich, The Presidents
and Civil Disorder 191 (Brookings Institution 1941) (stating that “[i]n general it may be
said that governors who have been compelled to call for help have had little disposition to
assert control over the federal forces. On the contrary, they have been thankful to be
relieved of a burdensome problem.”).
22. The Insurrection Act is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006). Governor Blanco’s
press secretary stated that Governor Blanco refused President Bush’s request because
“[s]he would lose control when she had been in control from the very beginning[.]” Bumiller
& Haberman, supra n. 21, at [¶ 15].
23. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335; H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions upon Use of the Army Imposed
by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 Mil. L. Rev. 85, 105–107 (1960). For the purposes of this
Article, the term “Insurrection Act” refers to the law codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335
(2006), unless otherwise stated. Troops have been deployed on an emergency basis outside
of the Insurrection Act on a very limited basis and primarily without prior Presidential
approval. Furman, supra n. 23, at 104–107.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006). Commentators have frowned on such exceptions. See e.g.
Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124
Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding before Any More Damage is Done, 175 Mil. L. Rev.
86 (2003) (offering that exceptions to the Act undermined Homeland Security strategy);
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federal military forces from actively participating in civilian law
enforcement absent congressional or constitutional authority.25
When invoked by the President, the Insurrection Act allows federal military forces to participate in domestic law-enforcement
activities.26
In light of Governor Blanco’s earlier refusal to request federal
troops pursuant to the Insurrection Act, President Bush sent a
formal legal memorandum asking her to request a federal takeover of the relief effort.27 When this also failed, President Bush
suggested a hybrid command structure under which a three-star
general, commanded and controlled by the federal government,
Matthew Carlton Hammond, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal, 75
Wash. U. L.Q. 953 (1997) (arguing that exceptions to the PCA are inconsistent with the
Act’s policy).
25. The Act states: “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or
the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (emphasis
added). Etymologically speaking,
The posse comitatus derives its name from the entourage or retainers [that] accompanied early Rome’s proconsuls to their places of duty and from the comte or counte
courts of England. It was a summons to every male in the country, over the age of
fifteen, to be ready and appareled, to come to the aid of the sheriff for the purpose of
preserving the public peace or for the pursuit of felons.
Furman, supra n. 23, at 87 (emphasis in original). For a more complete discussion of the
PCA, see generally Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for
Posse Comitatus, 12 Wash. U. J.L. & Policy 99, 101 (2003) (examining the history and
origins of the PCA and arguing that the “War on Terrorism” will “be fatal” to the Act); Kirk
L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. Rev. 67 (2000)
(discussing martial law and how the military’s role in the United States has evolved over
time); Felicetti & Luce, supra n. 24, at 87 (seeking to “set the record straight on the [PCA]”
by correcting policymakers’ “profound misunderstanding of this law”); Hammond, supra
n. 24, at 953 (arguing that the PCA should be revised to prevent its use in “drug interdiction at our borders”); Note, Honored in the Breech: Presidential Authority to Execute the
Laws with Military Force, 83 Yale L.J. 130, 152 (1973) (providing an overview of the President’s authority to deploy troops domestically and concluding that “[a]ction by Congress is
necessary if it is to prevent the continued erosion of its power to control the use of military
force in domestic affairs.”); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward A
Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 383 (2003) (discussing the PCA’s
shortcomings); James P. O’Shaughnessy, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics
Reconsidered, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 704 (1976) (examining “whether the [PCA]
remains viable in its present form or, if not, what modification best suits the contemporary
world”); Jim Winthorp, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and
Other Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), 1997 Army Law. 3, 3 (discussing the
“legal authorities supporting the [Department of Defense’s] response to the Oklahoma City
bombing”).
26. Furman, supra n. 23, at 103.
27. Greenberger, supra n. 16, at 114.
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would be sworn into the Louisiana National Guard. The general
would control all of the troops in the area.28 This suggestion was
also rejected by Governor Blanco.29
Governor Blanco’s refusal to either turn over the National
Guard under her control or seek a federal takeover placed the
Bush Administration in a difficult position. First, many Administration members were unfamiliar with the Insurrection Act and
wondered what action, if any, they could take.30 More specifically,
they were unsure whether President Bush could legally send
troops, federalize the Louisiana National Guard, or both, absent a
request by Governor Blanco.31 Second, assuming that President
Bush did have legal authority to take action, some members of
the Administration questioned the political wisdom of doing so.32
An anonymous senior Administration official aptly summarized
the Administration’s conundrum, stating:
Can you imagine how it would have been perceived if a
[P]resident of the United States of one party had preemptively taken from the female governor of another party the
command and control of her forces, unless the security situation made it completely clear that she was unable to
effectively execute her command authority and that lawlessness was the inevitable result?33

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Political Issues Snarled Plans for
Troop Aid, N.Y. Times A1 [¶ 5] (Sept. 9, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 14201473) (stating that “[i]nterviews with officials in Washington and Louisiana show that as the
situation grew worse, they were wrangling with questions of federal/state authority,
weighing the realities of military logistics and perhaps talking past each other in the crisis.”).
31. Id. at [¶¶ 1, 5, 28–29].
32. Id. at [¶¶ 2–3]. This quandary has not been relegated to this particular President,
but rather has been present throughout this country’s history due to federalism. Federal
Intervention in the States for the Suppression of Domestic Violence: Constitutionality,
Statutory Power, and Policy, 1966 Duke L.J. 415 [hereinafter Federal Intervention]. Federal Intervention further states:
Moreover, even if it is decided that there is power to intervene, there is the basic and
acute political problem of whether troops are to be the means of intervention. A long
tradition of civilian government and distrust of military rule . . . is hardly conducive
to ready acceptance of massive federal intervention . . . .
Id. at 459.
33. Lipton, Schmitt & Shanker, supra n. 30, at [¶ 9].
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After losing precious time grappling with the issue,34 the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel eventually and correctly
determined that under Section 333 of the Insurrection Act, President Bush could take action by either sending troops or
federalizing Louisiana’s National Guard even without Governor
Blanco’s permission.35 But instead of invoking the Insurrection
Act, two separate commands, contrary to military doctrine, were
put in place to handle the relief efforts—one directed by President
Bush and the other directed by Governor Blanco.36 Because the
Insurrection Act was not invoked, the federal troops under the
command of President Bush could not, pursuant to the PCA, participate in law enforcement activities.37

34. Senator Joe Lieberman, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, stated:
Our Committee has learned . . . of some disagreements about the degree to which
the Defense Department should operate on [United States] soil, and these disagreements may have limited the military’s response time and effectiveness in this case
because of the initial hesitation to deploy active[-]duty troops or even to preposition
assets before Hurricane Katrina made landfall . . . .
Sen. Comm. Homeland Sec. & Govtl. Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: The Defense Department’s
Role in Response, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (Feb. 9, 2006).
35. Lipton, Schmitt & Shanker, supra n. 30, at [¶ 30].
36. H.R. Rpt. 109-377 at 201. “This dual chain of command structure, lengthy federal
troop activation system, and, in the case of [Hurricane] Katrina, devastated local authorities, contributed to a poorly coordinated federal response to [Hurricane] Katrina.” Id.; see
also Mazzone, Commandeerer, supra n. 15, at 301 (discussing the dual chain of command
and its shortcomings); Mark C. Weston & David R. Brooks, Review of the Posse Comitatus
Act after Hurricane Katrina 12 (U.S. Army War College 2006) (available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA448803)
(stating that “[u]nfortunately a catastrophic major disaster demands unity of command,
while an emergency requires unity of effort.”). Lieutenant General Russel Honore led the
federal troops in Joint Task Force Katrina, and Major General Bennett Landreneau led
the Louisiana National Guard. Scott, supra n. 10, at [¶ 17]. Major General John White
relayed one example of the problems that can arise with multiple commands when he
noted that at one point “[w]e had someone who needed to [be] rescued . . . [and] five helicopters went to the same place to get one person out.” Scott Benjamin, CBS News, Bigger
Military Role in Disasters? Lawmakers Must Decide Pentagon’s Role While Respecting
States, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/25/national/main883220.shtml (posted
Sept. 25, 2005).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1385. See Robert Burns, ArmyTimes, Bush: Boost Military Role in
Domestic
Emergencies,
http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/1-292925-1108645.php
(posted Sept. 19, 2005) stating:
The active-duty elements that Bush did send to Louisiana and Mississippi included
some Army and Marine Corps helicopters and their crews, plus Navy ships. The
main federal ground forces, led by troops of the [Eighty-Second] Airborne Division
from Fort Bragg, [North Carolina], arrived five days after [Hurricane] Katrina
struck. They helped with evacuations and performed search[-]and[-]rescue missions
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As the Hurricane Katrina relief effort illustrates, both Governor Blanco and President Bush, like previous elected officials
before them, struggled to properly and promptly deploy federal
troops during a domestic emergency. This shortcoming was due to
problems associated with: (1) interpreting the Insurrection Act;
(2) federalism; and (3) public opinion.38 This Article, divided into
four Parts, attempts to resolve those problems, or at least
decrease the likelihood of their reoccurrence, by offering suggestive changes to the Insurrection Act.
Part II provides a general overview of the Insurrection Act. It
begins with a brief discussion of two early episodes of civil disorder: Shays’ Rebellion, the catalyst for the Insurrection Act, and
the Whiskey Rebellion, which provided the first test of the
statute. Part II concludes with the Insurrection Act’s codification.
Part III examines the most recent effort to clarify or update
the Insurrection Act, the Enforcement of the Laws to Restore
Public Order Act (Enforcement Act).39 The Enforcement Act, often
viewed as a power grab by the Executive Branch,40 was passed in
the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and repealed
in flooded parts of New Orleans but did not join in law enforcement operations. The
federal troops were led by Lt. Gen. Russel Honore.
Id. See also Dougherty, Big Easy Drowned, supra n. 11, at 144–145 (describing the lawlessness of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and local authorities’ inability to control
it).
38. Isaac Tekie, Bringing the Troops Home to a Disaster: Law, Order, and Humanitarian Relief, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1227, 1258 (2006).
39. Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404 (Oct. 17, 2006). The Enforcement Act
was part of the John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007. Id. For more information
surrounding the Enforcement Act’s passage, see infra pt. III, which details the Act’s controversial history and subsequent repeal. When signing the law to repeal the Enforcement
Act, President Bush included a somewhat ambiguous signing statement that left some to
question whether he or future Presidents will feel bound by the current Insurrection Act:
Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222, purport to impose
requirements that could inhibit the President’s ability to carry out his constitutional
obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to protect national security, to supervise the executive branch, and to execute his authority as Commander
in Chief. The executive branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent
with the constitutional authority of the President.
Dennis J. Kucinich, Articles of Impeachment of President George W. Bush, Art. XI,
http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=93581 (Jun. 10, 2008)
(quoting President Bush’s statement when signing the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008)).
40. See Jackie Gardina, Toward Military Rule? A Critique of Executive Discretion to
Use the Military in Domestic Emergencies, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 1027, 1063 (2008) (stating:
“Those contending that the amendment served to expand Executive power have the
stronger argument.”).
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shortly thereafter.41 While generally supportive of the Enforcement Act, Part III asserts that it would have had little effect on
the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. This is because
the Enforcement Act, while adding clarity to the Insurrection Act,
failed to address the two other major issues associated with
deploying the military domestically: (1) federalism, or state and
federal relations; and (2) public opinion. Thus, like the Insurrection Act, President Bush probably would not have invoked the
Enforcement Act in response to Hurricane Katrina.
Part IV offers possible solutions beyond the Enforcement Act
to both reduce federal-state friction and minimize the negative
impact of public opinion when federal troops are used domestically. For instance, Part IV suggests creating uniform standards
by which governors can request military assistance from the President. Part IV also advocates reinstating judiciary advisory
opinions to help determine when troops should be deployed
domestically.
Until Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent passage and
repeal of the Enforcement Act, legal scholarship on the Insurrection Act was limited.42 The works that did address this area of law
tended to focus on whether the President had inherent
authority to deploy troops domestically. One notable exception is
a recent work that questions the constitutionality of several sec41. Others argue that another reason for passing the Enforcement Act was to retaliate
against Governor Blanco’s refusal to request federal troops. For example, Senator Patrick
Leahy stated:
[W]hen Governor Blanco . . . would not give control of the National Guard over to
[the] President and the Federal chain of command[,] Governor Blanco rightfully
insisted that she be closely consulted and remain largely in control of the military
forces operating in the State during that emergency. This infuriated the White
House, and now they are looking for some automatic triggers—natural disasters,
terrorist attacks, or a disease epidemic—to avoid having to consult with the Governors.
152 Cong. Rec. S10805 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).
42. During the early 1970s, Professor Engdahl wrote three law review articles in
which he argued that the modern-day Insurrection Act reflected neither the intent of the
constitutional drafters nor the English common law from which the statute was derived.
David E. Engdahl, The New Civil Disturbance Regulations: The Threat of Military Intervention, 49 Ind. L.J. 581 (1974) [hereinafter Engdahl, New Civil]; David E. Engdahl,
Anthony F. Renzo & Luize Z. Laitos, A Comprehensive Study of the Use of Military Troops
in Civil Disorders with Proposals for Legislative Reform, 43 U. Colo. L. Rev. 399 (1972)
[hereinafter, Engdahl, Renzo & Laitos, Comprehensive Study]; David E. Engdahl, Soldiers,
Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 Iowa
L. Rev. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Engdahl, Soldiers].
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tions of the Insurrection Act.43 By way of contrast, this Article
explores the practical applications of the Insurrection Act by concentrating on ways to improve its use. While this Article does
briefly touch upon the previously mentioned constitutional issues,
the main goal is to carry the debate to the next level and develop
an improved, updated Insurrection Act. The revised Insurrection
Act must address both the current and future challenges that are
sure to arise as this country becomes increasingly reliant on the
active-duty military for homeland security.44
II. THE INSURRECTION ACT
A. Background
While at least one legal scholar suggests that the seeds of the
Insurrection Act were sown by Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in
eighteenth-century England,45 most view Shays’ Rebellion, which
occurred between 1786 and 1787, as the catalyst for the Insurrection Act’s existence. Shays’ Rebellion, named after Captain Daniel
Shays, a Revolutionary War veteran, was a quasi-revolt in which
armed farmers in western Massachusetts, known as “Shaysites,”
took up arms.46 These “regulators” or “insurgents,” as they were
43. William C. Banks, Providing “Supplemental Security”—The Insurrection Act and
the Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. Natl. Sec. L. & Policy 39 (2009).
Professor Banks compellingly argues that, absent exceptional circumstances, it is unconstitutional for the federal government to respond to internal domestic violence without a
prior request by the state. Id.; but see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government:
Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507 (1991) (arguing for
the federal government’s increased role in protecting United States citizens).
44. For example, by 2011, the Department of Defense plans to have 20,000 additional
active-duty service members deployed within the United States. Spencer S. Hsu & Ann
Scott Tyson, Pentagon to Detail Troops to Bolster Domestic Security, Wash. Post [¶ 1] (Dec.
1, 2008) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/30/
AR2008113002217.html).
45. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra n. 42, at 45, 47. “With lingering concerns over Shays’
Rebellion, some of the Framers regarded the Domestic Violence Clause as a grant of power
to the federal government . . . a recognition that no government incapable of offering protection to its citizens was worthy of the devotion of those citizens.” Jay S. Bybee, Insuring
Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 77 (1997).
46. See U.S.History.org, U.S. History: Pre-Columbian to the New Millennium: 15a.
Shays’ Rebellion, http://www.ushistory.org/us/15a.asp (accessed Aug. 27, 2010) (providing
a historical overview of Shays’ Rebellion). While in retrospect it is questionable whether
this was truly a revolt, at the time most people took the threat posed by Captain Daniel
Shays and his men quite seriously. See e.g. Jason A. Crook, Student Author, Toward a
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called at the time, were angry at not only the state, but also the
courts and merchants whom the Shaysites held responsible for
their high taxes and excessive debts.47 The combination of tax and
debt collection had caused numerous farmers to lose their farms
and land in debtors’ prison.48
At least initially, the uprising was fairly successful and the
Shaysites managed to disrupt Western Massachusetts’ commerce,
tax collection, and court systems.49 This was due in large part to
the governing structure of the Articles of Confederation, which
left Massachusetts’ militia understaffed.50 The Articles also gave
the central federal government little real authority or ability to
aid the state.51 Meanwhile, other states were either unable or
unwilling to help Massachusetts in its time of need, and the central government could not require them to do so.52
While the rebellion was ultimately put down by a privately
financed militia raised by wealthy Boston merchants, Captain
Shay and his Shaysites generated enough havoc to raise alarms
in not only Massachusetts, but also throughout postRevolutionary War America.53 The rebellion demonstrated the
central government’s overall impotence when faced with a smallscale internal military threat. To some, Shays Rebellion and the
idea of democracy run amok greatly contributed to the presence of
men like George Washington at the Constitutional Convention,
which was held the following year to amend the Articles of Confederation.54

More “Perfect” Union: The Untimely Decline of Federalism and the Rise of the Homogenous
Political Culture, 34 U. Dayton L. Rev. 47, 76 (2008) (stating that “[i]f nothing else,
Shay[s’] Rebellion certainly illustrated that a relatively small insurgency could pose a
serious danger to the political order”).
47. Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders
1789–1878, at 4 (David F. Trask ed., U.S. Army Ctr. of Military History 1988).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Art. of Confederation, art. VI (superseded 1787 by U.S. Const. arts. I–VII) (stating:
“[N]or shall any body of forces be kept up by any State, in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed
requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defen[s]e of such State.”).
51. Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56
U. Cin. L. Rev. 919, 923 (1988).
52. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 6.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 7.
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As history subsequently demonstrated, the Constitutional or
Federal Convention went well beyond amending or reconfiguring
the Articles of Confederation. In fact, an entirely new Constitution was created. In drafting the Constitution, the Framers took
several steps to prevent a reoccurrence of uprisings like Shays’
Rebellion. Of particular significance were Article I, Clause 15 and
Article IV, Section IV. The latter clause, known as the Guarantee
or Domestic Violence Clause,55 reads: “The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”56
According to one legal scholar, “[a]t its most basic level, the
Domestic Violence Clause provides a procedure by which a state
can request assistance from the federal government.”57 Others
have interpreted this Section as imposing a duty on the federal
government “to protect states against domestic violence, but only
when states request assistance.”58
The other clause, known as the Militia Clause, reads: “To
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections[,] and repel Invasions[.]”59 This
clause grants Congress the authority to use the militia to ensure
that: (1) the law of the land is being executed; (2) insurrections
are suppressed; and (3) invasions are repelled.60 Interestingly, the
debate over the Militia Clause at the Constitutional Convention,
at least according to legal scholar Alan Hirsch, did not center on
the “three situations in which the federal government could call
out the militia.”61 Rather, it focused on “whether the federal gov55. Professor William C. Banks, a national security and constitutional law scholar,
goes further by dividing these clauses into three categories: (1) the Guarantee Clause;
(2) the Invasion Clause; and (3) the Protection Clause. Banks, supra n. 43, at 40.
56. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
57. Bybee, supra n. 45, at 75. According to Professor Banks, the state’s “request” is
essential to this clause because without it, the federal government is precluded from combating domestic violence by deploying troops to the state absent extraordinary
circumstances. Banks, supra n. 43, at 40–41.
58. Bybee, supra n. 45, at 4.
59. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. According to Professor Banks, this applies to “an
especially serious act, far more so than simple disobedience of the laws.” Banks, supra
n. 43, at 53.
60. Banks, supra n. 43, at 53.
61. Hirsch, supra n. 51, at 926.
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ernment should have any power [at all] to call out the militia.”62
This was due in large part to concerns with the standing army
and militia at the time.63
B. Legislative History
Although the above-mentioned Militia Clause grants Congress the power to call up the militia on certain occasions, it is
actually the President, as Commander-in-Chief, who directs or
leads that militia.64 The Constitution, however, does not explicitly
grant the President authority to call up the militia.65 Thus, Congress felt it necessary to pass legislation delegating that authority
to the President.66 Congress’ initial attempt at drafting authorization language resulted in the Calling Forth Act, a precursor to the
Insurrection Act.67
Passed in 1792, the Calling Forth Act authorized the President to call up the militia to: (1) suppress insurrections; (2) repel
invasions; and (3) ensure that the laws are being faithfully
executed.68 Section 1 of the Calling Forth Act reads as follows:
That whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in
imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or
Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the
62. Id. (emphasis in original).
63. “Samuel Adams warned that ‘the Sins of America may be punished by a standing
Army’ . . . .” Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution 1781–
1788, at 14–15 (U. of N.C. Press 1961). And during the federal convention, Luther Martin
stated that “when a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce them
to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army . . . .” Luther Martin, Speech, General
Information (Phila., Pa., 1787) in Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 vol. 3, at 209
(Max Ferrand ed., Yale U. Press 1911) (emphasis in original).
64. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
65. Id.; but see Bybee, supra n. 45 (arguing that the President has inherent authority
to deploy troops domestically).
66. Bybee, supra n. 45, at 42.
67. Calling Forth Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 264 (1792) (repealed 1795). But some commentators believe that early versions of the Insurrection Act expanded, rather than limited,
Presidential power. Riot Control, supra n. 21, at 644.
68. 1 Stat. at 264. In 1789, the Standing Army consisted of 640 men. Hirsch, supra
n. 51, at 943. The state militias were the main fighting forces during this time period. Id.
When describing the two statutory Sections, Professor Gardina states that “Congress
created a ‘sliding scale’ of discretionary authority. When the country was facing invasion,
the President’s discretionary authority was at its apex; however, when it came to enforcing
the laws, the President’s authority was at its lowest ebb . . . .” Gardina, supra n. 40, at
1057.
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United States, to call forth such number of the militia of the
state or states most convenient to the place of danger or
scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such
invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose, to such
officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper; and
in case of an insurrection in any state, against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, on application of the legislature of such state,
or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened)
to call forth such number of the militia of any other state or
states, as may be applied for, or as he may judge sufficient to
suppress such insurrection.69

One interesting and somewhat peculiar aspect of this Section,
which is replicated in the modern-day Insurrection Act, is that
the statute did not allow the President to call the militia of the
state where the insurrection actually occurred into federal service.70 The President could only call the militia(s) of “any other
state or states.”71 One commentator speculates that the reason for
this disconnect is because presumably “the militia of the state
applying for aid would already be employed in suppressing the
insurrection.”72
As noted by Professor Vladeck and others,73 Section 1 of the
Calling Forth Act was met with little opposition when it was
initially introduced and debated in Congress.74 Most congressmen
were in agreement that the President should be able to call out
the militia under the circumstances described in Section 1. But
the same cannot be said for Section 2 of the Calling Forth Act,

69. 1 Stat. at 264 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 20.
73. Professor Stephen I. Vladeck has written extensively on the President and Congress’ competing power to use the militia. See e.g. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension
Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 275 (2008) (arguing that in the debate
over habeas corpus rights for noncitizens in United States territories technically outside of
jurisdiction, the answer is not clear-cut and may be that the Military Commissions Act of
2006 is constitutional); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension
Power, and the Insurrection Act, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 391 (2007) [hereinafter Vladeck, Field
Theory] (contending that habeas rights cannot be suspended unless there is a situation
where martial law is appropriate).
74. Stephen I. Vladeck, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 Yale L.J. 149, 159
(2004) [hereinafter Vladeck, Emergency Power].
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which authorizes the President to call out the militia “to execute
the laws of the [u]nion when necessary.”75 Section 2 states:
[W]henever the laws of the United States shall be opposed,
or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals
by this act, the same being notified to the President of the
United States, by an associate justice or the district judge, it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call
forth the militia of such state to suppress such combinations,
and to cause the laws to be duly executed. And if the militia
of the state, where such combinations may happen, shall
refuse, or be insufficient to suppress the same, it shall be
lawful for the President, if the legislature of the United
States be not in session, to call forth and employ such numbers of the militia of any other state or states most
convenient thereto, as may be necessary, and the use of the
militia, so to be called forth, may be continued, if necessary,
until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement
of the ensuing session.76

When first introduced, Section 2 was controversial and garnered
the attention of many members of Congress for several reasons.
First, some felt that this grant of authority to the President disrupted the delicate constitutional balance with respect to
controlling and operating the militia.77 The Framers, ever fearful
of a standing army and any one entity or person exerting too
much influence over the militia, divided control of it among the
states, Congress, and the President.78 For example, the Constitution gives states the responsibility for appointing and training
militia personnel.79 But the Constitution also states that Congress
75. Gardina, supra n. 40, at 1058. (discussing 1 Stat. at 264).
76. 1 Stat. at 264 (emphasis added).
77. John F. Romano, State Militias and the United States: Changed Responsibilities
for a New Era, 56 A.F. L. Rev. 233, 238 (2005). The attention paid to the militia may seem
out of place today; however, at the time, the militia was the primary military force for the
United States. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra n. 42, at 44. But interestingly, the Roman Professional Army was broken into smaller groups, or legions, in order to distribute its power.
Romano, supra n. 77, at 238.
78. In the Declaration of Independence, one of the grievances listed against King
George III of England was that he “kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies
without the Consent of our legislatures.” Declaration of Independence [¶ 13] (1776).
79. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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is in charge of “organizing, arming, and disciplining[ ] the
[m]ilitia,”80 and can use the militia to suppress insurrections,
repel invasions, and enforce the laws.81 And once called up, the
Constitution places the militia under the command and control of
the President, not Congress.82
The Framers put this “shared[-]power paradigm” in place to
not only prevent any one entity from exercising too much control
over the military,83 but also to create friction as the jurisdictional
responsibilities of the states, Congress, and the President overlap.
For the most part, this friction is thought to be healthy because it
strengthens the system of checks and balances while simultaneously decreasing the likelihood of martial law.84 Thus, to some
members of Congress, granting this new authority to the President in Section 2 of the Calling Forth Act upset the traditional
power-sharing arrangement.85
A few members of Congress also viewed the terms “opposed”
and “obstructed” in Section 2 as too vague.86 At the time, and
arguably today, no one could definitively state what activities or
actions these terms actually covered.87 For example, Congressman
Abraham Clark suggested that under the Calling Forth Act the
President could “call forth the military in case of any opposition to
the excise law; so that if an old woman was to strike an excise
officer with her broomstick, forsooth the military is to be called
out to suppress an insurrection.”88 To allay the fears of Congressman Clark and others, and also ensure the legislation would pass,
Congress added several procedural safeguards to Section 2—and
the statute as a whole—to decrease the likelihood of potential
misuse by the President.
80. Id. The Constitution also grants Congress the authority to appropriate money “[t]o
raise and support Armies.” Id. at cl. 12.
81. Id. at cl. 15. Congress relied on this constitutional clause when it passed the
Insurrection Act.
82. Id. at art. II, § 2.
83. Gardina, supra n. 40, at 1032.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1058; see also Coakley, supra n. 47, at 22 (noting that Congress eventually
reached a “consensus . . . that the delegation of powers to the [P]resident should be as
restricted as possible.”).
86. 3 Annals of Cong. 574–575 (1792).
87. Id. at 574. This lack of specificity has plagued the Insurrection Act in future iterations. Gardina, supra n. 40, at 1033; see Coakley, supra n. 47, at 22–23 (discussing changes
made and ambiguities within earlier renditions of the Act).
88. 3 Annals of Cong. at 575.
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First, in Section 2, Congress required a judicial determination that the laws were indeed obstructed by “combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or the powers vested in the marshals” before the
President could call up the militia.89 Also, in Section 2, unlike
Section 1, Congress placed restrictions on the President’s ability
to use the militia of one state in another state.90 The statute as a
whole also contained additional safeguards. One such safeguard
required that the President issue a dispersal order to the insurgents before any troops were deployed, and those troops that did
deploy were limited to periods of three months per year.91 The
President was also limited to acting only when Congress was not
in session, and then only for thirty days after Congress convened.92 Finally, the statute included a sunset provision.93 With
the addition of these safeguards, the Calling Forth Act successfully passed in both the House and Senate, and became law in
1792.94
It was not long before the new legislation was put to its first
real test during the Whiskey Rebellion. In the early 1790s, western Pennsylvania frontiersmen—who were unhappy with the
federal excise tax on alcohol—rebelled against the government.95
Numbering in the thousands, these insurgents, or “insurrectionists,” gathered openly to challenge the federal government’s
authority to tax their alcohol.96 They burned the home of a tax
collector, robbed the mail, halted court proceedings, and threatened to attack Pittsburgh.97 Fearing a repeat of Shays’ Rebellion,
President George Washington, after consulting with his Cabinet,
invoked the Calling Forth Act.98

89. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 20–21.
90. Vladeck, Emergency Powers, supra n. 74, at 160.
91. Mazzone, Commandeerer, supra n. 15, at 309.
92. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 22.
93. Id.
94. 1 Stat. at 265.
95. Bybee, supra n. 45, at 49–50.
96. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 30, 35. While President George Washington and his
Administration appeared to have a firm understanding of the Calling Forth Act, some
critics questioned whether this was really a “rebellion” in the strictest sense. Id. at 37.
97. Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United
States vol. 1, at 120 (Knopf 1988).
98. Bybee, supra n. 45, at 49–50.
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Before deploying the militia, President Washington requested
an opinion from Associate Supreme Court Justice James Wilson
as to whether the insurrectionists were a “combination[ ] too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings . . . .”99 Justice Wilson responded to President
Washington within two days, stating:
Sir:—From the evidence which has been laid before me, I
hereby notify to you that in the counties of Washington and
Allegheny, in Pennsylvania, laws of the United States are
opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshal
of that district.100

President Washington’s judicial inquiry was not technically
necessary because he could have invoked the Calling Forth Act
under either Section 1 or 2, and Section 2 was the only one that
required a judicial determination.101 But this judicial determination helped lend support and legitimacy to the federal
government’s action against the insurrectionists, which might be
one reason why President Washington was able to obtain such a
large turnout of militia volunteers to combat the insurrectionists.102
Shortly after receiving Justice Wilson’s opinion, President
Washington issued his dispersal order.103 When insurrectionists
99. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 36.
100. H.M. Brackenridge, History of the Western Insurrection 1794, at 264 (Arno Press &
N.Y. Times 1969).
101. 1 Stat. at 264.
102. President Washington’s popularity was another factor in the large turnout of militia members. See e.g. Brackenridge, supra n. 100, at 265–266 (indicating that President
Washington successfully solicited assistance from other states bordering Pennsylvania,
and with the help of Pennsylvania’s state governor, President Washington also managed to
rally Pennsylvanians to join the militia).
103. Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 110 (2005) [hereinafter Mazzone, Security]. When calling up the militia on August 7, 1794, President
Washington stated:
I, George Washington, President of the United States, do hereby command all persons being insurgents as aforesaid, and all others whom it may concern, on or before
the [first] day of September next to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective
abodes. And I do moreover warn all persons whomsoever against aiding, abetting, or
comforting the perpetrators of the aforesaid treasonable acts, and do require all
officers and other citizens, according to their respective duties and the laws of the
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ignored the order and refused to lay down their arms, President
Washington and over 12,000 members of various state militias
from around the country marched to Pennsylvania.104 But by the
time President Washington arrived in western Pennsylvania with
his show of force, most of the insurrectionists had scattered and
given up their efforts.105 The few who remained were easily captured and tried.106 President Washington returned home even
more of a hero than when he left, and the troops under his command quickly and quietly returned to civilian life.107 While most
applauded the President’s actions, some, like Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin, thought that the judiciary, rather than the
militia, should have handled the insurrection.108
With the successful end of the Whiskey Rebellion and the
quick disbandment of President Washington’s militia, many of the
previous fears and concerns associated with a President’s possible
abuse of power under Section 2 of the Calling Forth Act were
momentarily eased. And instead of the Calling Forth Act sunsetting, it was permanently reenacted in 1795 as the Militia Act,
albeit with fewer constraints on the President’s ability to use the
militia.109 In the Militia Act, former Section 2 of the Calling Forth
Act was amended as follows:

land, to exert their utmost endeavors to prevent and suppress such dangerous proceedings.
George Washington, By the President of the United States of America: A Proclamation, in
James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–
1897 vol. 1, 132 (Bureau Natl. Literature 1897).
104. Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and the Separate Community Doctrine, 76 Miss. L.J. 135, 204 (2006). The actual size of President Washington’s
militia was 12,950, which was approximately the size of the Revolutionary Army. Id. at
204 n. 347. The militia members’ large turnout demonstrated the general population’s
overall confidence in the President’s decision to use military force to put down the insurrection. Matt Matthews, The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical
Perspective 10 (Combat Studies Inst. Press 2006) (available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/army/csi_matthews_posse.pdf).
105. Martin, supra n. 104, at 206.
106. Id.
107. See Coakley, supra n. 47, at 76 (noting that President Washington received praise
for his actions involving the militia during the Whiskey Rebellion).
108. Rich, supra n. 21, at 8. This is not to say, however, that Governor Mifflin did not
support President Washington’s efforts to put down the rebellion. Id.
109. Militia Act of 1795, 1 Stat. 424 (1795) (repealed in part 1862 and current version
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006)).
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[W]henever the laws of the United States shall be opposed,
or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, to call forth the militia of such state, or of any
other state or states, as may be necessary to suppress such
combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed; and
the use of militia so to be called forth may be continued, if
necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the next session of Congress.110

The Militia Act omitted both the judicial determination requirement of whether the laws are obstructed and the limitation on the
President’s use of the militia from one state in another state.111
The Militia Act also modified the dispersal order requirement so
that the President no longer had to issue it before calling out the
militia.112 Arguably, this last change laid the groundwork for
future Presidents to take vastly different approaches to issuing
dispersal orders, sometimes choosing not to issue one at all.113
One change not implemented by the Militia Act, much to
future President Thomas Jefferson’s dismay, was a statutory
broadening of the term “militia” to include federal troops.114 As
originally written, the Calling Forth Act only referenced the militia, and was silent on the use of federal military forces.115 Thus,
110. Id.
111. Compare 1 Stat. at 264 with 1 Stat. at 424 (removing both the judicial determination requirement and the constraints on using militia from other states).
112. Id.
113. See e.g. Rich, supra n. 21, at 171 (noting that upon receipt of the District of
Columbia’s request for federal troops during the Bonus March, President Hoover “at once
instructed the Secretary of war to call out the troops.”).
114. President “Jefferson, devoutly committed to the defense of the nation by militia,
reduced the size of the already small standing army and championed legislation, passed in
1806, prescribing greater federal oversight of the militia.” Hirsch, supra n. 51, at 943.
115. 1 Stat. at 264. One legal commentator suggests this was due to the small nature of
the federal army in comparison to the state militias:
In 1792, the Army’s authorized strength (not actual or effective strength, which was
almost certainly lower) was around 2000 troops, so the failure to specifically mention
the regular troops may have been due to their small numbers in relation to the state
militias, which consisted of every free white able-bodied male between eighteen and
forty-five.
Felicetti & Luce, supra n. 24, at 97 n. 38. In 1789, the Standing Army consisted of 640
men. Hirsch, supra n. 51, at 943. The state militias were the main fighting forces during
this time period. Id.
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temporary exceptions had to be granted to Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson to allow for their use of federal troops
domestically.116 In some instances those Presidents simply acted,
neither requesting exceptions to the Acts nor receiving congressional permission to deploy federal troops.117
The issue of using federal troops reached its apex when President Thomas Jefferson requested a legal opinion from his
Secretary of State James Madison on the legality of using the
Army to pursue former Vice President Aaron Burr, whom the
President suspected of leading a filibuster into Mexico.118 Secretary of State Madison informed President Jefferson that “it does
not appear that regular troops [as distinguished from militia] can
be employed under any legal provision against insurrections—but
only against expeditions having foreign countries as the object.”119
This inability, at least in the mind of President Jefferson and his
Secretary of State, to use federal troops to stop Vice President
Burr led to the passage of the Insurrection Act of 1807, which
reads as follows:
[I]n all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws,
either of the United States, or of any individual state or territory, where it is lawful for the President of the United
States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing
such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed,
it shall be lawful for him to employ, for the same purposes,
such part of the land or naval force of the United States, as
116. Sean J. O’Hara, The Posse Comitatus Act Applied to the Prosecution of Civilians,
53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 767, 770 (2005) (stating that “[i]n order to enforce the Neutrality Proclamation, the nascent federal government federalized state militias to prevent privateers
from being outfitted to prey on British ships.”). Additionally, the Neutrality Act of 1794
provides that
[I]n every case of the capture of a ship or vessel within the jurisdiction or protection
of the United States . . . and in every case in which any process issuing out of any
court of the United States, shall be disobeyed or resisted by any person or persons
having the custody of any vessel of war, . . . it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States . . . to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United
States or of the militia thereof as shall be judged necessary for the purpose of taking
possession of, and detaining any such ship or vessel.
1 Stat. 381, 384 (1794) (repealed 1818).
117. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 69–84.
118. In this context, “filibuster” denotes the use of a private army to attack a foreign
country. Black’s Law Dictionary 661 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
119. Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President: Second Term, 1805–1809, at 253 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1974) (emphasis added and alterations in original).

File: Hoffmeister.GALLEY.Publication Copy Revisited.docxCreated on: 10/12/2010 7:34:00 PM

882

Stetson Law Review

Last Printed: 10/18/2010 10:46:00 AM

[Vol. 39

shall be judged necessary, having first observed all the [prerequisites] of the law in that respect.120

The Insurrection Act of 1807 made two noteworthy changes. First,
it removed the word “invasion” as an occurrence where the President could deploy troops; up to this point, the prior Acts all
referenced both “insurrections” and “invasions.”121 This change
most likely occurred because it was understood that the President
would send troops to any state under invasion or facing a foreign
threat, as opposed to an internal one.122 Second, the Insurrection
Act of 1807 authorized the President to use both federal troops
and the militia to enforce the laws and prevent insurrections.123
The constitutionality of the 1807 Insurrection Act has come
under question by some who argue that Congress lacked authority to pass the legislation.124 This argument is premised upon the
fact that Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution only
references the “militia” and makes no mention of any other military force, federal or otherwise.125 According to Professor Engdahl,
who has written extensively on domestic military use, using “regular troops was not pursuant to the letter of the Constitution,
which at most contemplated only militia for this role.”126 This
view was shared by President Millard Fillmore.127 President Fill120. 2 Stat. at 443 (emphasis added). This Part is discussing the original Act, not the
statutes codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335.
121. Compare 2 Stat. at 443 with 1 Stat. at 264 (removing the word “invasion” from the
Act).
122. But according to Professor Vladeck, this latter change remains a “rather uncomfortable mystery.” Vladeck, Emergency Power, supra n. 74, at 165. One potential answer to
this mystery lies in the fact that the drafters were trying to head off any potential problems that occur when the term “invasion” is used. See e.g. Frederick Bernays Wiener, The
Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 181, 189 (1940) (stating that “the New
York militia was unanimously of opinion that ‘to repel Invasions’ meant just that, and that
it did not involve battling the British in Canada.”).
123. 2 Stat. at 443.
124. See e.g. Clarence I. Meeks, III, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities
in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 Mil. L. Rev. 83, 83–93 (1975) (discussing the
history of “[s]trong opposition to military encroachment into civil affairs” leading up to the
passage of the Posse Comitatus Act).
125. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
126. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra n. 42, at 49.
127. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 989–991 (2008). In discussing the
Insurrection Act of 1807, President Fillmore stated: “[A]nd probably no legislation of Congress could add to or diminish the power thus given but by increasing or diminishing or
abolishing altogether the Army and Navy. . . .” Id. at 989. In contrast, Senator Andrew

File: Hoffmeister.GALLEY.Publication Copy Revisited.docxCreated on: 10/12/2010 7:34:00 PM

2010]

Last Printed: 10/18/2010 10:46:00 AM

An Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century

883

more also noted that the law could not apply to federal troops
because it conflicted with the President’s constitutional duties as
Commander-in-Chief.128
The arguments put forth by President Fillmore, Professor
Engdahl, and others raise interesting and complex constitutional
issues that, although beyond the scope of this Article, still require
at least brief mention.129 The debate centers on two longstanding
and currently unresolved questions. The first is whether and to
what degree Congress can restrict or expand the President’s
domestic Commander-in-Chief authority.130 The second is whether
the President has inherent constitutional authority to deploy
troops domestically.131
For the purposes of this Article, it is maintained that the
President does not have inherent constitutional authority to
deploy troops domestically, but rather derives this power from
congressional authorization.132 This is the generally, but not
universally, accepted view.133 Two caveats or exceptions to this
Butler of South Carolina, who at the time was writing a report responding to the question
of the President’s inherent authority to use the military domestically, stated: “I deny that
the President has a right to employ the army and navy for suppressing insurrections . . .
without observing the same prerequisites prescribed for him in calling out the militia for
the same purpose.” Id. at 991.
128. Id. at 989.
129. President’s Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement of
Federal Court Orders—Little Rock, Arkansas, a 1957 Attorney General opinion, provides
one such example. 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 313, 331 (1957). Attorney General Herbert Brownell,
Jr. opines that within the PCA “[t]here are . . . grave doubts as to the authority of the
Congress to limit the constitutional powers of the President to enforce the laws and preserve the peace under circumstances [that] he deems appropriate.” Id.
130. Barron & Lederman, supra n. 127, at 989–990.
131. Candidus Dougherty, “Necessity Hath No Law”: Executive Power and the Posse
Comitatus Act, 31 Campbell L. Rev. 1, 15, 22–23 (2008).
132. Id. at 18–24. The strongest argument for granting the President inherent authority generally arises during emergency situations. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 67
(1890). Cunningham is often cited as support for “the concept of ‘inherent’ [P]residential
emergency power and the concept that the President, by virtue of the Take Care Clause,
has emergency powers nowhere explicit in the Constitution.” Vladeck, Emergency Power,
supra n. 74, at 184.
133. For an alternative argument, see President Roosevelt’s actions during the North
American Aviation strike of 1941. Rich, supra n. 21, at 184. Attorney General and later
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson stated that President Roosevelt’s actions during
the strike were based on the “aggregate of the President’s powers derived from the Constitution itself and from statutes enacted by Congress.” Id.; see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895) (denying a writ of habeas corpus and holding an injunction may be issued to enjoin
an obstruction of interstate commerce even if the obstruction is an offense resulting in
criminal prosecution, and the punishment for violation of the injunction is not an exercise
of criminal jurisdiction); Charles Doyle, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The
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position, which depending on their interpretation may swallow
the rule, are the following: (1) the President has an implied right
to protect federal entities or property like the United States mail
and federal buildings; and (2) Congress cannot pass legislation
that prevents the President from fulfilling his or her constitutional duties.134
As for the 1807 Insurrection Act, support for its constitutionality can be found in several places. First, looking beyond
Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 and examining Congress’ War Powers in their entirety under Article I, Section 8, there is a strong
argument that Congress did have authority to pass the Insurrection Act of 1807.135 Second, the opinion by Secretary of State
Madison is simply his opinion, not binding law. Third and probably most persuasive, when deploying troops domestically,
Presidents from Washington to Bush have mostly adhered to the
Insurrection Act’s requirements.136 This trend helps demonstrate
that the individuals most impacted by the Insurrection Act
viewed the statute as binding law. Compare this with the War
Powers Act which, like the Insurrection Act, serves to limit PresiUse of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, Cong. Research Serv. 95-964 (June 1, 2000)
(available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/95-964.pdf) (summarizing the Posse Comitatus Act and related provisions).
134. William Taft, the country’s only President to serve on the Supreme Court, was
quoted as saying:
The President is made Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy by the Constitution evidently for the purpose of enabling him to defend the country against
invasion, to suppress insurrection[,] and to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use of the army for any of these
purposes, the action would be void. . . . [H]e is to maintain the peace of the United
States. I think he would have this power under the Constitution even if Congress
had not given him express authority to this end.
William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 128–129 (Columbia U. Press
1916); contra Stephen I. Vladeck, The Calling Forth Clause and the Domestic Commander
in Chief, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1091, 1095 (2008) (stating: “[T]he reality that the Constitution
expressly envisions a role for Congress to play in providing for governmental responses to
even the most existential crises dramatically undermines arguments evoking a broad
independent authority for the domestic Commander-in-Chief.”).
135. Vladeck, Emergency Power, supra n. 74, at 156, 165.
136. While Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson strictly adhered to the Insurrection Act for the most part, they at times improperly relied upon the federal army—for
example, the circumstances surrounding use of the Neutrality Act and how Fries Rebellion
was handled. See generally Coakley, supra n. 47, at 69–77 (detailing President John
Adams’ Administration’s use of military force during the Fries Rebellion); O’Hara, supra
n. 116, at 770 (discussing the federal government’s efforts to “federalize state militias to
prevent privateers” from preying on British ships, which was prohibited under the Neutrality Act of 1794).
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dential power but has yet to be fully recognized by any sitting
President as either constitutional or binding.137
After the Insurrection Act of 1807, Congress refrained from
passing any similar laws for the following fifty years. But this
time period did see two significant Supreme Court decisions
involving the Insurrection Act. The first was Martin v. Mott,138
which arose out of the War of 1812.139 In Martin, defendant Jacob
E. Mott was court-martialed for failing to report to the New York
Militia after President James Madison called it up to fight the
British.140 After being convicted and severely fined, Mott filed an
appeal alleging there was no state of emergency when the New
York Militia was called up.141 Mott also argued that President
Madison lacked authority to either call out or federalize the New
York militia.142
Nearly twelve years after the War of 1812 concluded, the
Supreme Court finally determined that the 1795 Militia Act did
give the President authority to call up or federalize the militia.143
Justice Story delivered the unanimous Court’s opinion, stating:
We are all of opinion that the authority to decide whether
the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President,
and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.
We think that this construction necessarily results from the
nature of the power itself, and from the manifest object contemplated by the [1795 Militia Act].144

The second major case during this time period was Luther v.
Borden,145 which was decided in 1849.146 Luther arose in the con137. Overview of the War Powers Resolution, 8 Op. Off. Leg. Counsel 271, 274 (1984).
The Executive Branch believes that “[Section] 2(c) of the [War Powers Resolution] does not
constitute a legally binding definition of Presidential authority to deploy our armed
forces.” Id. For more information on Presidents’ loose adherence to, and the history and
proposed reform of the War Powers Act, see generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Triggering Congressional War Powers Notification: A Proposal to Reconcile Constitutional Practice with
Operational Reality, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 687 (2010).
138. 25 U.S. 19, 20 (1827).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 20–22.
141. Id. at 22–24.
142. Id. at 24.
143. Id. at 31–32.
144. Id. at 30.
145. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
146. Id. at 1.
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text of an ongoing “civil” war, Dorr’s Rebellion in Rhode Island, in
which the Charterites (state-government supporters) were pitted
against the Dorrites (shadow-government supporters).147 The Dorrites’ primary grievance was Rhode Island’s lack of voting rights
for all white males.148 The Dorrites drafted a competing state constitution and actually engaged in skirmishes with the
Charterites.149 At the time, President John Tyler was hesitant to
invoke the Militia Act and send federal troops to Rhode Island to
quell the ongoing dispute between the Charterites and the Dorrites.150
Luther found its way to the Supreme Court of the United
States because Martin Luther, a Dorrite supporter, filed a trespass suit against Luther Borden, a Rhode Island state official.151
Martin Luther alleged that the Rhode Island state government
that employed Borden was illegitimate because it was not “republican” in nature, as required by Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution.152 Thus, Luther claimed that Borden was without
cause to search his house and arrest him.153 The civil suit brought
by Luther raised two very interesting and unique questions. First,
could the Supreme Court determine which of the two competing
state governments was legitimate? Second, could the Supreme
Court review President John Tyler’s decisionmaking under the
Domestic Violence Clause?
The Court found both questions were beyond judicial
review.154 With respect to the first question, Chief Justice Taney
determined that “it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State.”155 As for the second
147. Rhode Island was divided into “two vying state governments: the government
established by th[e] so-called ‘People’s Constitution,’ headed by Thomas W. Dorr, and the
Charter government.” Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
1473, 1476 (1987). While Dorr was away in Washington, the Charter government seized
prominent officials of the People’s government, strengthening its hold in Rhode Island.
Paul M. Thompson, Is There Anything “Legal” About Extralegal Action? The Debate over
Dorr’s Rebellion, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 385, 403 (2002).
148. Luther, 48 U.S. at 35; Thompson, supra n. 147, at 397–399.
149. Colantuono, supra n. 147, at 1476; Thompson, supra n. 147, at 400.
150. Thompson, supra n. 147, at 402.
151. 48 U.S. at 2, 34.
152. Id. at 35, 42.
153. Id. at 34.
154. Id. at 42–45.
155. Id. at 42.
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question, the Court stated: “By th[e 1795 Act], the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government
of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the President.”156 Both Luther and Martin established that the President is
the ultimate arbiter in determining whether an insurrection
exists and, if so, whether troops should be deployed.
In 1861, with the prospect of a full-fledged Civil War drawing
ever nearer, Congress again reexamined the President’s authority
to use the military under Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, which
resulted in passage of the Suppression of the Rebellion Act.157
This new law reflected much of the modern-day language of the
Insurrection Act. The relevant portions of the Suppression of the
Rebellion Act read as follows:
That whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the
authority of the Government of the United States, it shall
become impracticable, in the judgment of the President . . .
to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the
laws of the United States within any State or Territory . . .,
it shall be lawful for the President . . . to call forth the militia of any or all the States of the Union, and to employ such
parts of the land and naval forces of the United States as he
may deem necessary to enforce the faithful execution of the
laws . . ., or to suppress such rebellion in whatever State or
Territory thereof the laws . . . may be forcibly opposed, or the
execution thereby forcibly obstructed.158

As with past laws, this Act also strengthened a President’s ability
to use the military to suppress insurrections and execute the laws
of the Union.159 The Act gave the President sole discretion to
determine whether it was impracticable to enforce the laws “by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”160 Previous Acts
authorized the President to call out the military only if there
existed “combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordi156. Id. at 43. “[I]f the President in exercising this power shall fall into error, or invade
the rights of the people of the State, it would be in the power of Congress to apply the
proper remedy.” Id. at 45.
157. 12 Stat. 281, 281–282 (1861).
158. Id. at 281.
159. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra n. 42, at 55.
160. Id.
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nary course of judicial proceedings, or by powers vested in the
marshals.”161 But under the new Act, the President made the
decision alone.162 The Suppression of the Rebellion Act also added
“rebellion against the authority of the government of the United
States” to the list of occurrences during which the President could
call out the military.163 Finally, the Act doubled the time period in
which the President could call out the militia, and extended the
President’s authority to include territories as well as states.164
Ten years later, Congress modified the law again during
Reconstruction, in the form of the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act
of 1871.165 Section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act included the following language:
That in all cases where insurrection, domestic violence,
unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in any State shall so
obstruct or hinder the execution of the laws thereof, and of
the United States,[166] as to deprive any portion or class of
the people[167] of such State of any of the rights, privileges, or
immunities, or protection, named in the Constitution and
secured by this act, and the constituted authorities of such
State shall either be unable to protect, or shall, from any
cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people in such rights,
such facts shall be deemed a denial by such State of the
equal protection of the laws to which they are entitled under
the Constitution of the United States; and in all such cases,
or whenever any such insurrection, violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy shall oppose or obstruct the laws of
the United States or the due execution thereof, or impede or
obstruct the due course of justice under the same, it shall be
lawful for the President, and it shall be his duty to take such
measures, by the employment of the militia or the land and
161. Id. at 55–56 (emphasis omitted).
162. 12 Stat. at 281.
163. Coakley, supra n. 47, at 228.
164. Id.
165. Ku Klux Klan Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1988); see Alfred Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some
Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 St. Louis U. L.J. 331,
332–356 (1967) (discussing the debates surrounding the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871).
166. For a discussion of the debate about whether this Section should refer to the
obstruction of both state law and federal law, see Federal Intervention, supra n. 32, at 441–
442.
167. This may mean one or more individuals. Id. at 446.
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naval forces of the United States, or of either, or by other
means, as he may deem necessary for the suppression of
such insurrection, domestic violence, or combinations; and
any person who shall be arrested under the provisions of this
and the preceding section shall be delivered to the marshal
of the proper district, to be dealt with according to law.168

This change authorized the President to call forth the military
when domestic violence or an insurrection resulted in a denial of
the civil rights conferred to citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment.169 According to military historian Paul Scheips, under this
Act the President had a “‘duty’ to use either the militia or regular
forces, or both, whenever there were obstructions to execution of
the laws that deprived ‘any portion or class of the people’ of any
state ‘the equal protection of the laws.’”170
Like the Suppression of the Rebellion Act, some legal scholars
have questioned the constitutionality of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, claiming these later changes to the Insurrection Act
“blurred the distinctions historically and constitutionally made
between ‘insurrection’ and lesser forms of ‘domestic violence.’”171
According to critics, combining acts of insurrection with lesser
forms of domestic violence allows the President to deploy federal
troops to combat minor state episodes of civil disorder or domestic
violence, regardless of whether state officials request assistance.172 This interpretation goes well beyond the Framers’
original intent, and encourages federal military intervention in
matters that are purely state affairs.
A statutory analysis of the Insurrection Act encompassing the
Framers’ early intent reveals that these legal scholars have the
better argument, assuming all variables remain constant. But
that is not the case. The Framers, who preferred limiting federal
168. 17 Stat. at 14 (emphasis added). This last clause “relating to the marshals was
deleted in 1875 in the Revised Statutes version and in subsequent recodifications.” Federal
Intervention, supra n. 32, at 455–456.
169. 17 Stat. at 14.
170. Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–
1992, at 5 (Ctr. of Military History, U.S. Army 2005) (quoting 17 Stat. at 13).
171. Banks, supra n. 43, at 64; see also Engdahl, Soldiers, supra n. 42 (discussing the
reasons behind not permitting the use of military force to suppress civil disorders).
172. See generally Federal Intervention, supra n. 32 (discussing the President’s ability
to intervene in state episodes of domestic violence without the state requesting federal
assistance).
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military intervention in state affairs, envisioned neither the size
of the current standing Army nor that the modern-day militia, the
National Guard, would: (1) receive the majority of its funding
from the federal government; (2) actually become part of the
Army; and (3) routinely be sent overseas.173 Thus, a more nuanced
view of the Insurrection Act in light of the expanded role of the
modern-day militia is appropriate.
Additionally, adopting a strict statutory reading of the Insurrection Act may have prevented the use of federal troops in the
South during the 1950s and 1960s.174 Those civil rights examples—where state officials never requested federal assistance—
could be classified as “lesser forms of domestic violence.”175 It
should also be noted that the Insurrection Act and its earlier versions, although challenged in court, have yet to be found
unconstitutional.176
In due course, the congressional Acts of 1792, 1795, 1861, and
1871 were codified in the Revised Statutes of the United States in
1875, and reprinted in the United States Code in 1926.177 They
appeared later in Title 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335.178
Section 331, which can be traced to the Acts of 1795 and
1807,179 was last invoked during the Los Angeles Riots of 1992.180
Section 331 authorizes the President to deploy the militia or the
armed forces at the request of state officials to suppress an insur173. Wiener, supra n. 122, at 207–210; see also Romano, supra n. 77, at 233–234 (discussing how “the present-day organization and responsibilities of the National Guard, the
modern equivalent of a state militia, directly contravene the principles and rationales of
the [F]ramers”).
174. See e.g. Danielle Crockett, The Insurrection Act and Executive Power to Respond
with Force to Natural Disasters 8–9, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disasters/
Crockett.pdf (accessed June 23, 2010) (indicating that when President Eisenhower invoked
the Insurrection Act to send federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas in the 1950s, and
when President Kennedy invoked the Act to send federal troops to Mississippi and Alabama in the 1960s, it was unclear upon which Section of the Act each President actually
relied).
175. The term “lesser form of domestic violence” is highly subjective; its meaning
depends on who is making the claim and may be subject to very different interpretations.
176. Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d. 555 (1958). But the court never reached the merits of
this case because it was dismissed on procedural grounds. Id. at 560.
177. Scheips, supra n. 170, at 5, 5 n. 7. The Acts of 1795 and 1807 were combined in
Section 5297 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, Section 5297. Id. at 5 n. 7. The
Act of 1861 was placed in Section 5294. Id. The Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871 was codified in
Section 5299. Id.
178. Id. at 5.
179. Id. at 5 n. 7.
180. Tekie, supra n. 38, at 1259.
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rection.181 This Section also fulfills the federal government’s constitutional responsibility under the Domestic Violence Clause.182
Section 332, which can be traced to the Act of 1861,183 authorizes the President—even without the consent of state officials—
to deploy the militia or armed forces when “obstructions” or
“rebellion[s]” make it impracticable to enforce the laws through
court orders.184 According to one Attorney General, Section 332
“expressly authorized [the President] to employ the military forces
of the United States to aid in enforcing the laws” once determining that such enforcement was being obstructed by powerful
“combinations of outlaws and criminals.”185 President Dwight D.
Eisenhower relied on this Section when he sent federal troops to
enforce the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas’ desegregation order in Little Rock, Arkansas.186 Not
surprisingly, this Section, like Section 333 below, has at times
created friction between state governors and the President.187

181. 10 U.S.C. § 331.
182. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
183. Scheips, supra n. 170, at 5 n. 7.
184. 10 U.S.C. § 332.
185. Op. on Suppression of Lawlessness in Ariz., 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 333, 335 (1882)
(emphasis in original).
186. See Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 226–227 (E.D. Ark. 1957) (enjoining the
Governor of Arkansas from preventing eligible black students from attending a white high
school because the governor was acting beyond his lawful authority and contrary to the
federal Constitution, the school district’s integration plan, and that court’s prior order);
Allan L. Bioff, Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Law, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 249 (1957) (discussing the constitutionality and implications of federal-state and congressional-Executive
relationships after President Eisenhower used federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas);
George H. Faust, The President’s Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Law, 7 Clev.-Marshall
L. Rev. 362 (1958) (discussing various Presidents’ use of troops to enforce federal law and
concluding with a discussion on the reasoning behind President Eisenhower’s sending
troops into Arkansas when the governor refused to follow the ruling of a federal judge);
Daniel H. Pollitt, A Dissenting View: The Executive Enforcement of Judicial Decrees, 45
A.B.A. J. 600 (1959) (discussing the constitutional provisions and acts of Congress that
have given the President the authority to enforce federal judicial decrees by using military
force); Jack B. Schmetterer, Reply to Mr. Schweppe: Military Enforcement of Court Decrees,
44 A.B.A. J. 727 (1958) (arguing that President Eisenhower had the authority to use federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas under Sections 332 and 333); Alfred J. Schweppe,
Enforcement of Federal Court Decrees: A “Recurrence to Fundamental Principles”, 44
A.B.A. J. 113 (1958) (arguing that President Eisenhower did not have constitutional
authority to enforce the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas’ decree by
using federal troops because only Congress possessed that authority).
187. Scheips, supra n. 170, at 36–38.
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Under Section 333, which can be traced to the Acts of 1861
and 1871,188 the President, without state officials’ consent, can
deploy the military, militia, or “any other means”189 to suppress
“any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracy”190 if the action denies any class of people its rights or
hinders the execution of the laws.191 Due to the broad terms used
in Section 333, it is not entirely clear what events are actually
covered by Section 333.192 For instance, President John F. Kennedy relied on this Section when he dispatched federal troops to
military bases near Birmingham, Alabama to suppress periodic
race riots.193 But one year later, Attorney General Robert Kennedy found Section 333 did not apply when three civil-rights
workers were killed in Neshoba County, Mississippi.194 Attorney
General Kennedy’s decision was met with strong criticism from a
group of law professors who, in a letter that appeared in both the
New York Times and the Congressional Record,195 argued that
“paragraph 2 of [S]ection 333 authorized federal ‘police action’ to
protect civil rights workers in circumstances such as those which
existed in Mississippi.”196
Section 334, which can be traced to the Acts of 1792 and
1795,197 requires the President to issue a proclamation ordering
the insurgents to disperse.198 For a variety of reasons, Presidents
188. Id. at 4–5.
189. While the phrase “any other means” lacks certainty, at least one law review article
has suggested that it allows the President to “utilize any individuals or agency [that] is at
his disposal and suited to law enforcement, which would include federal marshals.” Federal Intervention, supra n. 32, at 451.
190. 10 U.S.C. § 333.
191. Id. It is not clear what number of people constitutes a “class.” Federal Intervention,
supra n. 32, at 446.
192. See Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1984, at 152–161
(5th rev. ed., N.Y.U. 1984) (discussing the President’s legal authority when faced with
widespread civil disorder).
193. Federal Intervention, supra n. 32, at 417 (stating the statutory authority for dispatching federal troops in the vicinity of Birmingham, Alabama was Section 333,
paragraph 1). The then-Alabama Governor unsuccessfully challenged the President’s deployment of federal troops to the state. Ala. v. United States, 373 U.S. 545, 545 (1963).
194. Federal Intervention, supra n. 32, at 418. “Attorney General Kennedy ostensibly
took the position that such intervention was legally impossible[.]” Id. (emphasis in original).
195. Id. at 418, 419 n. 20.
196. Id. at 419.
197. Scheips, supra n. 170, at 4–5.
198. 10 U.S.C. § 334.
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have followed this requirement haphazardly.199 For example, during the Pullman Strike, President Grover Cleveland issued his
dispersal order five days after he deployed troops,200 while President Herbert Hoover never issued a dispersal order when he used
the Insurrection Act to evict the Bonus Army from Washington,
District of Columbia.201 Conversely, both Presidents George H.W.
Bush and Eisenhower issued repeated dispersal orders before
invoking the Insurrection Act.202 Finally, Section 335 includes
both Guam and the Virgin Islands in its definition of “State.”203 In
1989, President George H.W. Bush invoked the Insurrection Act
in the United States Virgin Islands to combat severe looting and
violence after Hurricane Andrew.204
After codification, subsequent efforts to amend the Insurrection Act began.205 In direct response to President Eisenhower’s
use of the Act in Little Rock, Arkansas, two separate pieces of legislation were introduced during the eighty-sixth Congress in
1957. The first, H.R. 416, would have amended “[S]ection 332 of
199. Rich, supra n. 21, at 201–206. “Practically every [P]resident who has been faced
with an internal disturbance has placed a different interpretation upon [the proclamation’s] use.” Id.
200. Gardina, supra n. 40, at 1062. There is a split of opinion on whether the President
sent troops to the Pullman Strike pursuant to the Insurrection Act or based on his
inherent authority. Id.
201. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by Charitable Organizations under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws,
69 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2003) (noting that President Hoover, who felt the Bonus Army’s
“demands were budget-breaking, extortionist, and a threat to public order” simply “ordered
the real Army to evict them.”).
202. See A Stern President’s ‘Inescapable’ Action, 43 LIFE 40 (Oct. 7, 1957) (stating that
“President Eisenhower . . . issued an emergency proclamation, ordering obstructionists to
‘cease and desist’ from interference with integration” in Little Rock, Arkansas); Douglas
Jeh. & James Gerstenzang, The Mind of the President; In Making Policy, George Bush
Relies on a Group of Comfortable Managers and Shies Away from Grand Ideas, L.A. Times
(Oct. 11, 1992) (discussing President George H.W. Bush’s televised May 2, 1992 address to
the nation on the Los Angeles Riots, during which he stated: “[L]et me assure you: I will
use whatever force is necessary to restore order”).
203. 10 U.S.C. § 335 (2006).
204. Providing for the Restoration of Law and Order in the Virgin Islands, Exec. Or.
12690, 54 Fed. Reg. 39153 (Sept. 20, 1989).
205. See Engdahl, Renzo & Laitos, Comprehensive Study, supra n. 42, at 413 (noting
that the Riot Commission suggested amending Section 331 because despite its historic
meaning, the Section is now regarded as authority to use federal troops in violent situations that do not have the “characteristics of political uprisings or genuine ‘insurrections’
at all.”); Gardina, supra n. 40, at 1077–1078 (discussing the current statute, which
requires the President to notify Congress “every [fourteen] days thereafter during the
duration of the exercise of that authority,” but suggesting that the statute does not provide
enough congressional oversight) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 333(b)).

File: Hoffmeister.GALLEY.Publication Copy Revisited.docxCreated on: 10/12/2010 7:34:00 PM

894

Stetson Law Review

Last Printed: 10/18/2010 10:46:00 AM

[Vol. 39

[T]itle 10 of the United States Code to limit the use of the Armed
Forces to enforce Federal laws or the orders of Federal Courts.”206
The second bill, H.R. 1204, would have amended “[T]itle 10 of the
United States Code to prohibit the calling of the National Guard
into Federal service except in time of war or invasion or upon the
request of a State.”207 H.R. 1204 appears to be in keeping with
those who worry that the lines between “insurrection” and “lesser
forms of domestic violence” have been blurred.208 Neither bill was
enacted.
Further attempts to modify the Insurrection Act were made
approximately ten years later, in the wake of numerous urban
riots during the late 1960s. The National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, otherwise known as the Kerner Commission,
offered several suggestive changes.209 For example, the Kerner
Commission proposed correcting the inconsistent language in Section 331 which, if read literally, does not allow the President to
use the National Guard from the state in which the insurrection
actually occurs.210 The Commission also suggested replacing the
term “militia” with “National Guard,” and the term “insurrection”
with “domestic violence.”211 Despite the respect garnered for this
bipartisan commission, Congress never implemented these suggested changes.212
In 1971 the Army, which was concerned about its ability to
respond to urban riots, studied possible changes to the Insurrection Act. The Army specifically examined the possibility of adding
206. Furman, supra n. 23, at 129 n. 258 (internal quotations omitted).
207. Id.(internal quotations omitted).
208. See e.g. Banks, supra n. 43, at 64 (noting that prior changes made to the Insurrection Act “blurred the distinctions historically and constitutionally made between
‘insurrection’ and ‘lesser form of domestic violence.’”).
209. See Report of the National Advisory Commn. on Civil Disorders 288 (D.C., Govt.
Printing Off.) [hereinafter Kerner Commn. Report]. The report investigated the urban riots
that took place in several United States cities between 1964 and 1967. Id. at 19–22. The
commission was to answer questions regarding what happened, why, and what could be
done to prevent such riots in the future. Id. at 1.
210. Id. at 288; see Coakley, supra n. 47, at 20 (noting that the first Section of the Calling Forth Act “did not explicitly authorize the [P]resident to call into federal service the
militia of the state where the insurrection should occur, only that of ‘any other state or
states.’”).
211. Kerner Commn. Report, supra n. 209, at 288. For an excellent argument as to why
the term “insurrection” cannot be replaced with “domestic violence,” see Banks, supra
n. 43, at 78.
212. Engdahl, Renzo & Laitos, Comprehensive Study, supra n. 42, at 431–445.
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the term “civil disturbance” to the statute in an effort to modernize or update the language.213 The Army also explored modifying
the Insurrection Act to allow the President to use both the
National Guard and the Army Reserves.214 Like the Kerner Commission’s proposals, Congress did not implement the Army’s
suggested changes.215 As such, the Insurrection Act was not modified until President George W. Bush signed the Enforcement Act
into law on October 17, 2006—135 years after its last revision.216
III. ENFORCEMENT ACT
A. Background
Like most legislation, the Enforcement Act was reactionary—
i.e., it was not attributable to some “Eureka!” moment where a
member of Congress or his or her staff, after reviewing the United
States Code, realized that the Insurrection Act needed revision.
Rather, the new law arose from the government’s inadequate
response to Hurricane Katrina and the public backlash that
ensued.217 Instead of holding individuals accountable for the failures surrounding the way the government handled Hurricane
Katrina,218 elected officials decided to change the method by
which the government responds to natural disasters and civil disorders. Part of this movement included modifying the

213. Scheips, supra n. 170, at 340.
214. Id.
215. See Kerner Commn. Report, supra n. 209, at 279–281 (discussing military task
forces that examined and reviewed military policies).
216. 120 Stat. at 2083.
217. See Brown, supra n. 19, at 32 (noting that the government’s response to Hurricane
Katrina was a contributing factor in the 2006 amendment); see also Interview by Ray
Suarez, PBS, with Andrew Kowhut, Pres. of Pew Research Ctr. (Sept. 9, 2005) (available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec05/opinion_9-09.html) (discussing the
country’s negative opinion of how the government handled Hurricane Katrina).
218. While the head of FEMA (Michael Brown) may have been forced to resign in Hurricane Katrina’s wake, the government’s failed response to the disaster arguably was not
solely due to one person. David Kilpatrick & Scott Shane, NYTimes.com, Ex-FEMA
Chief Tells of Frustration and Chaos, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/national/
nationalspecial/15brown.html (posted Sept. 15, 2005) (noting that Brown’s retelling of the
events surrounding the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina “raises questions
about whether the White House and [the Secretary of Homeland Defense] acted aggressively enough in the response. . . . The account also suggests that responsibility for the
failure may go well beyond Mr. Brown . . . .”).
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Insurrection Act.219 And, unlike earlier proposals, the ideas generated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina had the political
backing necessary for implementation.
For example, less than three weeks after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall, Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld urging him to “conduct a thorough review of the
entire legal framework governing a President’s power to use the
regular armed forces to restore public order in those limited situations involving a large-scale . . . emergency like the present
one.”220 The next day, the President’s national address to the
country proclaimed: “[I]t is now clear that a challenge [of Hurricane Katrina’s] scale requires greater federal authority and a
broader role for the armed forces—the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment’s
notice.”221 Yet even with this strong support, there was concern
over potential political opposition to any modification of the
Insurrection Act because many Americans were, and remain,
divided over who should be the lead agent in responding to
domestic emergencies—especially when military intervention is
required.222
On one side of the debate are those who fear overreliance
upon, and consolidation of military power within, the Executive
Branch. They believe that giving the President primary responsi219. See Weston & Brooks, supra n. 36 (reviewing the PCA in light of the government’s
response to Hurricane Katrina and recommending that Congress modify the PCA to clarify
the Act’s limitations); see e.g. Peter Gosselin & Doyle McManus, Katrina’s Aftermath:
Wider Powers for U.S. Forces in Disasters Are under Review, L.A. Times [¶ 2] (Sept. 11,
2005) (available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/11/nation/na-posse11) (reporting
that “Dan Bartlett, counselor to President Bush, said that the [A]dministration was
reviewing whether to increase the [P]resident’s power to dispatch troops at the outset of a
disaster and to give them law enforcement duties.”).
220. CBS MoneyWatch.com, Militarizing Law Enforcement?, http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m0JZS/is_21_21/ai_n25117695/ (posted Oct. 17, 2005) (quoting Ltr. from John
Warner, Sen. Armed Services Comm. Chairman U.S. Senator, to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec. of
Def., Reexamination of Posse Comitatus (Sept. 14, 2005)).
221. President George W. Bush, Speech, Address to the Nation from Jackson Square
(New Orleans, La., Sept. 15, 2005) (available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/
09/15/bush.transcript/).
222. See Mackubin T. Owens, Hurricane Katrina and the Future of Civil-Military Relations, N.Y. Post [¶ 5] (Sept. 2005) (available at http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/
owens/05/katrina.html) (addressing the pros and cons of having the military respond to
domestic disturbances). Owens also argues that increasing United States Military
involvement in domestic affairs is at odds with healthy civil-military relations. Id. at [¶ 4].
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bility for handling domestic emergencies will increase the likelihood of martial law or rule by military force223 and lead to the loss
of civil liberties.224 While these concerns, first raised by the Framers, may appear unwarranted and antiquated today, they are
actually quite relevant. The recently declassified 2001 Department of Justice memorandum entitled Authority for Use of
Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities within the United
States demonstrates the extent to which the Executive Branch
can and will stretch the limits of the law at the expense of individual constitutional rights.225 Thus, to those against expanding
the role of the Executive Branch during domestic emergencies,
the federal government should be considered the last—not first—
resort during times of civil disorder.226
In contrast, others feel that due to the speed, size, scope,
complexity, and magnitude of modern-day domestic emergencies,
combined with the potential for large-scale suffering and loss, the
federal government should be in charge of all but the most routine
matters.227 Proponents of this view argue that even when at full
223. See Siobhan Morrissey, Should the Military Be Called in for Natural Disasters?,
TIME (Dec. 31, 2008) (available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599
,1869089,00.html) (stating that a standing military attempting to enforce civil laws may
signal a “‘creeping militarism’ into our civilian culture and the erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act”).
224. Contra Tkacz, supra n. 11, at 302 (arguing that using the military in domestic
affairs protects civilian’s constitutional rights; it does not abrogate them). But consider
that during the 1950s and 1960s the federal government used the military on several
occasions to protect and ensure the constitutional rights of minorities. Id. at 313–314.
225. Memo. from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Atty. Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
counsel to the President, Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities
within the United States 25 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter DOJ Memo] (stating “that the
better view is that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to domestic military operations”)
(emphasis in original); see Mark Mazzetti & David Johnston, Bush Weighed Using Military
in Arrests, N.Y. Times [¶ 2] (July 24, 2009) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/
25/us/25detain.html) (noting that some of President Bush’s advisors, “including Vice President Dick Cheney, argued that a President ha[s] the power to use the military on
domestic soil to sweep up [ ] terrorism suspects”).
226. Rich, supra n. 21, at 5. In a letter to then Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton
dated September 16, 1792, President George Washington stated: “[T]he employing of the
regular troops avoided, if it be possible to effect order without their aid . . . . Yet if no other
means will effectually answer, and the [C]onstitution and laws will authorize these, they
must be used as the dernier resort.” Id.
227. See Robert Block & Amy Schatz, Florida Beat Back Washington during Hurricane
Wilma, Wall St. J. A1 (Dec. 8, 2005) (stating that “Adm. Timothy J. Keating . . . told lawmakers that active-duty forces should be given complete authority for responding to
catastrophic disasters.”); Elizabeth F. Kent, “Where’s the Cavalry?”: Federal Response to
21st Century Disasters, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 181, 193 (2006) (arguing that the Department
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strength, the National Guard of an individual state can quickly
become overwhelmed during a crisis.228 So taking a “wait-and-see”
approach to determine whether a state can handle a specific crisis, before involving the federal government, puts both lives and
property at risk.229 Thus, the argument continues, the federal
government with its superior resources—including the most
advanced military in the world—should have primary responsibility for managing civil disasters.230
In light of this split in American opinion, the Enforcement
Act was passed with little fanfare or public scrutiny. Both the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees helped draft the
Enforcement Act, but held neither hearings nor public debates on
the legislation.231 Once finalized, the Enforcement Act was quietly
tucked into a large defense authorization bill: the John Warner
Defense Authorization Act of 2007.232 Very few people, including
many members of Congress who voted on the larger defense bill,
actually knew they were also voting to modify the Insurrection
Act.233 The secrecy surrounding the Enforcement Act was so pervasive that the actual sponsor of the new legislation remains
unknown to this day.234
of Defense “is the federal government’s greatest resource for planning, logistics, and operational support.”).
228. Kent, supra n. 227, at 185–186. This false sense of security includes all man-made
or natural disasters with the potential for widespread destruction. Id. at 181.
229. See William A. Osborne, The History of Military Assistance for Domestic Natural
Disasters: The Return to a Primary Role for the Department of Defense in the Twenty-First
Century?, 2006 Army Law. 1, 18 (arguing that “the military should be recognized as the
primary agency to manage domestic disaster relief.”).
230. Id.; see Tkacz, supra n. 11, at 302 (noting that “[t]he delayed reaction to [Hurricane Katrina] suggests the need for an expansion of existing [P]residential authority to use
active military forces to rapidly secure the disaster area and rescue survivors”); Jim VandeHei & Josh White, Bush Weighs Greater Role for Military in Disaster Response, Wash.
Post [¶ 5] (Sept. 26, 2005) (available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=20050926&slug=ritabush26) (noting that President Bush was “asking Congress to consider a major change, potentially shifting federal responsibility for major
natural disasters from the Department of Homeland Security to the nation’s top military
generals.”).
231. Senator Leahy stated that the changes to the Insurrection Act were “just slipped
in the defense bill as a rider with little study.” Jeff Stein, CQ Homeland Security, Cong. Q.
[¶ 17] (Dec. 1, 2006) (available at 2006 WLNR 21099617) (internal quotations omitted).
232. Id. at [¶¶ 2, 18].
233. This observation is based on various readings and the Author’s personal experience as a congressional aide when the law was being passed.
234. But it is widely believed that Senator Warner was responsible for the change.
Gosselin & McManus, supra n. 219, at [¶¶ 12–13]. See James Bovard, CounterPunch,
Stomping Freedom: Inside the Martial Law Act of 2006, http://www.counterpunch.org/
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Unfortunately for the Enforcement Act’s proponents, this lack
of openness helped lay the groundwork for the law’s ultimate
repeal one year later.235 In addition to asserting that the
Enforcement Act was a power grab by the Executive Branch at
the expense of the states (one arguably orchestrated by Congress),
opponents claimed the Act passed without public review or consultation from any of the fifty state governors.236 According to the
new law’s detractors, state governors were entitled to at least
some input because the Enforcement Act granted the President
unprecedented unilateral authority to domestically deploy both
federal and state military forces.237
B. Changes Brought by the Enforcement Act238
Most of the changes brought by the Enforcement Act involved
Section 333 of the Insurrection Act. As previously discussed, this
Section authorizes the President, even against the wishes of a
state governor, to deploy the militia or use any other means to
suppress any “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy” if such action denies any class of people its
rights or obstructs the execution of the laws.239 Section 333 is genbovard01092008.html (posted Jan. 9, 2008) (stating that the Act “had bipartisan support
on Capitol Hill, including support from Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), Sen. John Warner (RVa.), Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), and Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.).”).
235. See H.R. 4986, 110th Cong. § 1068 (Jan. 3, 2008) (proposing to repeal the Enforcement Act passed one year prior).
236. Major General Timothy Lowenberg testified before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary as follows:
Without any hearing or consultation with the governors and without any articulation or justification of need, Section 1076 of the 2007 [National Defense
Authorization Act] changed more than [one hundred] years of well-established and
carefully balanced state–federal and civil[–]military relationships. One hundred
years of law and policy were changed without any publicly or privately acknowledged author or proponent of the change.
Sen. Jud. Comm., The “Insurrection Act Rider” and State Control of the National Guard,
110th Cong. 1076 [¶ 13] (April 24, 2007) (testimony of Major Gen. Timothy Lowenberg)
(available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2713&wit_id=6390).
237. See id. (stating that “imposing [p]residential control over the National Guard for
domestic purposes without notice to the governor and without the governor's consent
negates the unity of local-state-federal effort needed in times of domestic peril and would
undermine the speed and efficiency with which the National Guard responds under the
[g]overnor’s control”).
238. For a side-by-side comparison of the original Insurrection Act with the Enforcement Act, see Appendix 1.
239. 120 Stat. at 2404. Revised Section 333 added the phrase “or those obstructing the
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erally invoked when a governor and President are unable to reach
some sort of mutual agreement to deploy federal troops under
Section 331.240 When the President acts under Section 333, federal-state relations are undermined because the President usually
assumes command and control of the National Guard by federalizing it.241
The most controversial Section 333 modification, which ultimately led to the Enforcement Act’s repeal, concerned a specific
reference to events that, when combined with domestic violence,
gave the President nearly unchecked authority to deploy troops
domestically. The listed events were: “natural disaster, epidemic,
or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition.”242
Congressional opponents of the Enforcement Act, of which
there were many, made two basic arguments against the new law.
First, it was asserted that the listed events “create[d] triggers
that make it virtually automatic that the [Enforcement] Act
w[ould] be invoked during such emergencies.”243 Second, it was
claimed that the events provided the President with unprecedented authority to deploy troops domestically.244 Under either
argument, these critics claimed that the Enforcement Act would
work to consolidate control of the military within the Executive
Branch, resulting in governors losing control of their respective
National Guard personnel to the President during periods of civil
disorder.245
enforcement of the laws.” Id. at 2405.
240. Scheips, supra n. 170, at 46.
241. Kavan Peterson, Governors Lose in Power Struggle over National Guard [¶ 6],
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=170453 (posted Jan. 12, 2007).
242. 120 Stat. at 2404. These events, however, must be accompanied by or result in
some form of domestic violence. Id.
243. Sen. Jud. Comm., The “Insurrection Act Rider” and State Control of the National
Guard, 110th Cong. 1076 (April 24, 2007) (testimony of U.S. Sen. Kit Bond (R-MO))
[hereinafter Statement of Kit Bond] (available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=2713&wit_id=6399).
244. Id. (arguing that the changes would “provide the President with unnecessary and
unprecedented power.”).
245. Id. Shortly after the Enforcement Act was passed, then-Governor of Arizona Janet
Napolitano said the new law’s “expansion of federal authority during natural disasters . . .
could cause confusion in the command-and-control of the National Guard and interfere with
states’ ability to respond to natural disasters within their borders.” Ltr. from Janet Napolitano to Sens. Bill Frist & Harry Reid and Reps. Dennis Hastert & Nancy Pelosi, Governors’
Opposition to the House and Senate Dept. of Defense Authorization Bills to Federalize the
National Guard during Certain Emergencies and Disasters (Aug. 31, 2006) (available at
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The Enforcement Act’s defenders, whose position was made
all the more difficult by an unwillingness to openly and publicly
debate the law, claimed that the changes would not necessarily
result in greater domestic use of the military by the President.246
Instead, they argued, the change to Section 333 was merely a
clarification—the law did not grant the President any new power,
it only explained the authority the President already possessed.247
For example, the new terms listed could also be deemed acts of
insurrection, which have historically received a very broad interpretation.248 Furthermore, the new terms did not operate in a
vacuum because domestic violence remained a prerequisite to the
President’s ability to deploy troops domestically.249 The clarity
argument might have been more persuasive if the Enforcement
Act did not include the term “or other condition,” because adding
this term undercut the whole idea that the events listed in Section 333 of the Enforcement Act existed merely for clarification
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.d48f170fad5788d18a278110501010a0/
?vgnextoid=0a05e362c5f5d010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD&vgnextchannel
=70ad6eb58fda0010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD&vgnextfmt=print).
246. See Sen. Edward Kennedy’s remarks in favor of amending the Insurrection Act:
As I understand the amendment, it defines when the President can call on the
Armed Forces if there is a major public emergency at home. The amended statute
now lists specific situations in which the troops can be used to restore public
order. . . . These were not mentioned specifically before. While the amendment does
not grant the President any new powers, it fills an important gap in clarifying the
President’s authority to respond to these new kinds of emergencies.
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Public Law 109-364, the “John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007” (H.R. 5122), http://www.bordc.org/threats/hr5122.php (updated May 8,
2009).
247. Id.
248. There are several variations on how to define “insurrection.” For example, one
court stated that “to be an ‘insurrection’ there must be an intent to overthrow a lawfully
constituted regime.” Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 505 F.2d. 989,
1005 (2d Cir. 1974). Another court called an “[i]nsurrection . . . a rising against civil or
political authority,—the open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution
of law in a city or state.” In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1894). The
term has also been defined as “a rising against civil or political authority[;] . . . the open
and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of law in a city or a state.” 45
Am. Jur. 2d Insurrections § 1 (2007). And one journal further clarifies the term by stating:
Insurrection is distinguished from rout, riot, and offenses connected with mob
violence by the fact that, in insurrection, there is an organized and armed uprising
against authority or operations of government, while crimes growing out of mob
violence, however serious they may be and however numerous the participants, are
simply unlawful acts in disturbance of the peace [that] do not threaten the stability
of the government or the existence of political society.
77 C.J.S. Riot § 37 (2006).
249. 120 Stat. at 2404.
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purposes—namely, “or other condition” leaves this Section more
vague than the initial Insurrection Act.
Other changes brought by Section 333 of the Enforcement Act
occurred in the opening sentence, which was modified from “[t]he
President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by
any other means, shall take such measures . . .”250 to “[t]he President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard
in Federal service . . . .”251 This modification of the first sentence
had two very significant effects. First, replacing the word “militia”
with “National Guard” reduced the number of personnel available
to the President when invoking the Insurrection Act. This is
because the word “militia,” as evidenced by the definition below,
is much broader than the term “National Guard,” which is actually a subcomponent of the “militia.”252 Title 10 of the United
States Code states:
(a) The militia of the United States consists of all ablebodied males at least [seventeen] years of age and,
except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under
[forty-five] years of age who are, or who have made a
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the
United States and of female citizens of the United
States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are—
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the
National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of
the members of the militia who are not
members of the National Guard or the
Naval Militia.253

Thus, the Enforcement Act restricted the President to deploying
only the “Armed Services” and the “National Guard” under Section 333. But the Insurrection Act permits the President to deploy
both the Armed Services and the “militia,” which encompass not
250.
251.
252.
253.

10 U.S.C. § 333 (emphasis added).
120 Stat. at 2404 (emphasis added).
10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006).
Id.
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only the National Guard but other entities like the State Defense
Forces (SDFs).254 This difference is important because under the
Enforcement Act, unlike the Insurrection Act, the governor maintains some military resources, including the option to retain
control over SDFs.255 Although the point was never made publicly,
states stood to benefit from this portion of the Enforcement Act.
The second major change made in the first sentence of Section 333 of the Enforcement Act was the substitution of “may” for
“shall.”256 “May” generally denotes a privilege or discretionary
power,257 while “shall” generally indicates a duty imposed on a
person or entity.258 Thus, this Section of the Insurrection Act
placed a duty on the President to use the military when there
were obstructions to the execution of the laws that deprived
people of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.259 The
Enforcement Act removed that duty, making Presidential action
optional.260
In addition to removing the obligatory language, this change
also undercut the previously mentioned suggestion that the
Enforcement Act created triggers that automatically require the
President to invoke the Insurrection Act. Had this been the purpose of the Enforcement Act, then surely the new law’s
proponents would have kept “shall” instead of substituting “may.”
This change to the statute makes implementing Section 333 much
more discretionary under the Enforcement Act—another direct
benefit to the states.
254. Currently, twenty-one states maintain SDFs, which are voluntary military units
that operate completely under state control. State Defense Force, About the SDF,
http://statedefenseforce.com/database/about-the-sdf/ (accessed Sept. 2, 2010). Historically,
SDFs have served as a backup to the National Guard. Id. Members of the SDFs generally
do not receive payment for their services but may be provided uniforms and training. Id.
State Defense Forces are authorized pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). Id.
255. Since the Supreme Court decided Perpich v. United States, there has been a question of whether SDFs fall under the broad definition of “militia.” 496 U.S. 334 (1990). In
Perpich, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is nonetheless possible that [SDFs] are subject to call under 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–333 . . . .” Id. at 353.
256. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 333 with 120 Stat. at 2404 (noting the change in the statute
from “may” to “shall”).
257. Black’s Law Dictionary at 1000.
258. Id. at 1407.
259. See 120 Stat. 2083, at § 333 (noting the change in the statute from permissive
Presidential action to mandatory Presidential action).
260. “The original [Insurrection Act] § 333 required the President to take action . . . .”
Mazzone, Commandeerer, supra n. 15, at 318.
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Section 333 of the Enforcement Act also required that the
President inform Congress as soon as practicable when he
deployed troops under this statute, and every fourteen days
thereafter, when exercising federal authority.261 First and foremost, this change reasserted the “role for congressional oversight,
along the lines of the thirty-day (later sixty-day) time limit in the
early iterations of the Insurrection Act.”262 The reporting
requirement also served as a backup to the dispersal order that
ensured invoking the Insurrection Act was not a clandestine
affair that went without public notice.263 According to Professor
Stephen Dycus, “[p]art of the genius of the Insurrection Act is
before it can be invoked the President has to make a public declaration that he is doing it . . . . There is no way the President can
use that exception to the Posse Comitatus Act secretly.”264 Similar
to the dispersal order requirement, some legal commentators
have correctly downplayed the legal significance of a President
failing to report to Congress.265 But this is not to say those reporting requirements do not carry political significance. This is an
important point because, in the end, any retribution or penalty for
improperly using or failing to use the Insurrection Act is generally administered by the public, not the courts, as explained in
Part III.266
The one modification that occurred outside of Section 333 was
the actual name change of Chapter 15 from “Insurrection Act” to
“Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order.”267 While more
symbolic than substantive in nature, changing the name of Title
10, Chapter 15 did appear to address several previously raised
261. 120 Stat. at 2405.
262. Vladeck, Field Theory, supra n. 73, at 434.
263. See Morrissey, supra n. 223, at [¶ 12] (quoting Professor Stephen Dycus, a
national-security-law scholar).
264. Id. (quoting Professor Stephen Dycus).
265. See e.g. Gardina, supra n. 40, at 1063 (explaining that the President “now has
undisputed authority to send the military into a state”).
266. Due to the political nature of deploying troops, courts are generally hesitant to
entertain questions about the legality of the President’s actions under the Insurrection
Act. See supra pt. II(B), at nn. 109–125 (discussing the predominant legislative evolution
of the Insurrection Act).
267. Other commentators recommend changing the name to “Domestic Disaster Relief
Act” or “Domestic Disaster Relief and Insurrection Act” to reduce the stigma associated
with the name. ABA Standing Comm. on L. & Natl. Sec., Hurricane Katrina Task Force
Subcommittee Report 29 (Feb. 2006) (available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/
KatrinaReport.pdf).
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concerns about the statute. First, removal of the word “insurrection” from Chapter 15 updated the statute, as the term itself is
somewhat antiquated and rarely, if ever, used today.
Second, the change alerted individuals that the statute
encompassed more than just uprisings against the government;
instead, it dealt with public disorder in general. This evolution,
along with other previously mentioned changes, helped clarify a
law that has long been misunderstood.268 For example, Presidents
have historically used “‘riot,’ ‘lawlessness,’ and ‘insurrection’
interchangeably.”269 Also, at least one law review article argues
that the real problem with deploying federal forces during Hurricane Katrina was simply a misunderstanding of the Insurrection
Act by all parties involved.270 That article suggested that instead
of modifying the statute we should look to raise and improve
awareness of it, which is exactly what this name change does.271
Finally, changing the title seemed to signify that the use or commitment of federal troops was more open-ended and likely to
continue even after the violence or threat has ended.272
In sum, the changes brought by the Enforcement Act, like
past legislation, strengthened the power of the President. But this
is not to say that the states did not benefit from the Enforcement
Act. Aside from increasing the President’s authority, the changes
offered in the Enforcement Act lent some clarity to the Insurrection Act, which was plagued by both broad and undefined terms
throughout its two-hundred year history.273 But because of the
268. Id.
269. Riot Control, supra n. 21, at 644; see also Engdahl, Comprehensive Study, supra
n. 42, at 413 (stating that “[b]y usage, and not by judicial construction, Section 331 has
come to be regarded as authority for utilizing federal troops, and utilizing them as soldiers,
in situations of violence with no characteristics of political uprisings or genuine ‘insurrections’ at all.”).
270. Joshua M. Samek, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Case for Repeal
of the Posse Comitatus Act or a Case for Learning the Law?, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 441, 465
(2007); see also VandeHei & White, supra n. 230, at [¶ 9] (arguing that “[r]ather than
creating new laws and authorities . . . government officials simply need to execute existing
plans competently.”).
271. Samek, supra n. 270, at 465.
272. GDAEman, Changes to the Insurrection Act, http://gdaeman.blogspot.com/search?q
=insurrection (Jun. 10, 2008) (noting that changes made via the John Warner Defense
Authorization Bill “[e]xpand[ ] the military rights to a more open-ended role”).
273. General George S. Patton, Jr., who led federal troops against American veterans
(the Bonus Army), summarizes this idea best, stating: “Due to the combined effort of
ignorance and careless diction, there is widespread misunderstanding of the [principal]
terms used in connection with the enforcement of law by military means.” George S. Pat-
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manner in which the law was passed, few of the Enforcement
Act’s positive attributes ever came to public light.
Also, unlike the Calling Forth Act during the Whiskey Rebellion, the Enforcement Act was never thoroughly examined or
tested to see if it actually improved government responsiveness to
civil disorder. This Article now attempts to do just that, albeit
hypothetically, by applying the Enforcement Act to the federalstate dilemma experienced during the Hurricane Katrina crisis to
examine the statute’s effectiveness. In light of increased reliance
on the military domestically,274 this application is more than just
an academic exercise, as it is very likely that the Insurrection Act
will be questioned, reviewed, or modified again in the near future.
C. Application
As previously discussed, federal troops were not promptly
deployed in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
due to problems associated with: (1) interpreting the Insurrection
Act; (2) federalism; and (3) public opinion. The Enforcement Act,
had it been in place during Hurricane Katrina, would most likely
have addressed the concerns surrounding the statute’s interpretation. Under the Enforcement Act, the Executive Branch probably
would not have wasted as much time grappling with the issue of
whether it could legally federalize the Louisiana National Guard
against Governor Blanco’s wishes.275 Unlike the Insurrection Act,
Section 333 of the Enforcement Act makes it very clear that the
new law applies to “natural disasters” resulting in “domestic
violence.” Both of these elements were present in New Orleans.
Yet, as discussed earlier, this was only part of the equation with
respect to deploying troops because even after determining that
the Executive Branch had legal authority, the President, like the
Governor, was still very concerned about public opinion.
ton, Jr., Federal Troops in Domestic Disturbances [¶ 13] (Nov. 1932) (available at
http://www.pattonhq.com/textfiles/federal.html).
274. See Peter B. Kraska, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System 31–32
(Northeastern U. Press 2001) (discussing the increased use of domestic military forces
since “the early 1980s with the onset of the drug crisis.”).
275. See Sen. Rpt. 109-254 at 384 (May 9, 2006) (providing that “antique terminology
and the lack of explicit reference to such situations as natural disasters or terrorist attacks
may have contributed to a reluctance to use the armed forces in situations such as Hurricane Katrina.”).
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At that time, the President worried about how the public
would view his taking military command and control away from a
female governor of a southern state, especially one from the opposite political party.276 The Enforcement Act does not readily
address this concern. Arguably, the Enforcement Act, more so
than the Insurrection Act, insulated the President from negative
public opinion. For example, the President could always say that
he acted in accordance with the requirements of the statute
because Hurricane Katrina fit one of the specific events listed in
the Enforcement Act. But critics could just as easily turn around
and argue that the statute was discretionary, and did not require
Presidential action.
As for Governor Blanco, the Enforcement Act did little to
assuage her concerns. While the new law most likely ensured that
Governor Blanco would not lose her SDFs, the record is unclear as
to what role, if any, these forces would play.277 More importantly,
the Enforcement Act provided no mechanism for Governor Blanco
to gracefully accept federal intervention without appearing inept.
Under both the Enforcement Act and the Insurrection Act, governors appear as though they either buckle under pressure from the
President or fail to prepare for and adequately respond to domestic emergencies; in either case, the governor looks incapable of
managing civil disorder. Finally, the statute has no built-in
mechanism that addresses the relationship between the governor
and the President—the statute simply assumes that the two
elected officials will be able to work together.
In sum, if the Enforcement Act were in place at the time of
Hurricane Katrina, it would have clarified, at least in legal terms,
that President Bush could legally deploy troops regardless of
Governor Blanco’s views. But the new law would not necessarily
have altered the ultimate outcome because it was unlikely to be
invoked. This is because, like the Insurrection Act, the Enforcement Act neither addressed the political relationship between
276. See Lipton, Schmitt & Shanker, supra n. 30, at [¶ 8] (discussing the President’s
concerns about his public image if he unilaterally took the command and control away
from a female governor of a different political party absent her request for a federal takeover).
277. Ultimately, nearly 1,700 SDFs assisted during Hurricane Katrina. Martin Hershkowitz, Summary of Available State Defense Force after Action Reports from Hurricane
Katrina and Rita Deployments, 2 State Def. Force J. 13, 14 (2006) (available at
http://www.23bn-vdf.com/s3/AARs%20of%20SDFs%20in%20Katrina.pdf).
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President Bush and Governor Blanco nor thoroughly considered
the impact of public opinion on the two elected leaders.
IV. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE
INSURRECTION ACT
A. Readopting the Enforcement Act
In light of the shortcomings of both the Enforcement Act and
the Insurrection Act, this Article will now offer a few suggested
changes. The Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century
should first readopt a modified version of the Enforcement Act.
While this Article does not necessarily agree with the legislative
process by which the Enforcement Act was passed, it does find
that the statute, for the most part, improved the Insurrection
Act.278 From the Whiskey Rebellion to the Los Angeles Riots of
1992, there has been no consensus as to what constitutes either
“domestic violence” or an “insurrection.”279 Historically, elected
officials have applied widely different parameters to these
terms.280 On one extreme, those terms justified using the military
to forcibly remove the Bonus Army (World War I veterans) from
peacefully taking up residence in Washington, District of Columbia.281 On the other extreme, the terms were deemed inapplicable
to Hurricane Katrina, despite the chaos, lack of government services, and large loss of life and property damage.282
Not surprisingly, this unequal application of the Insurrection
Act has led to uncertainty and confusion as to the circumstances
under which the statute can be invoked.283 It has also hindered
and prevented governors from adequately preparing and planning
278. For an alternative view, see Banks, supra n. 43, at 77–78 (noting skepticism about
Congress’ intent to create a statue that was “purposefully ambiguous,” and explaining the
constitutional problems with the 2006 amendment).
279. Engdahl, New Civil, supra n. 42, at 586.
280. Bybee, supra n. 45, at 43; see also Engdahl, Comprehensive Study, supra n. 42, at
413 (noting that “the term ‘insurrection’ in what is now 10 U.S.C. § 331 began to be given a
meaning far broader than imperious assault upon the organized government of a state.”).
281. Laurie & Cole, supra n. 1, at 375 (noting that President Hoover followed “an array
of preliminary steps as required under . . . Section 331, Title 10, United States Code[ ]”
before deploying federal troops to disperse the Bonus Army) (emphasis removed).
282. See supra pt. I (discussing the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina).
283. See supra pt. II(B) (discussing several instances of confusion surrounding when the
President can invoke the Insurrection Act).
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for domestic emergencies because they are unsure which situations will give rise to federal military intervention. The
Enforcement Act, for the first time, took steps to rectify this problem. Rather than attempting to narrowly define broad terms like
“insurrection” or “domestic violence,” which might potentially
hinder future operations, the Enforcement Act did the next best
thing by listing specific conditions that could give rise to deploying federal troops domestically and federalizing the National
Guard.284
One major shortcoming of the Enforcement Act was the inclusion of the phrase “or other condition.” Despite arguments made
by the Enforcement Act’s proponents, it is fairly obvious that “or
other condition” works against clarifying the Insurrection Act.285
The phrase also leaves the Enforcement Act vague enough to
allow both state and federal officials to manipulate the statute.286
Further, “or other condition” creates a virtual Pandora’s Box of
unlimited future incidents that could result in the Insurrection
Act being invoked, so long as those incidents are coupled with
domestic violence.287 Thus, this Article suggests that Congress
should remove that phrase from any future version of the Insurrection Act. Taking such action would also mitigate fears that the
Enforcement Act was a power grab by the Executive Branch.288
Ironically, during the debate over the Enforcement Act, a few
congressional members actually championed the ambiguity traditionally found in the Insurrection Act, claiming that it was
intentional, “fostered caution, and . . . encouraged consultation
and deliberation between federal[, ]state[, ]civilian[,] and military
decisionmakers.”289 But the ambiguity found in the Insurrection
284. 120 Stat. at 2404. These events, however, must be accompanied by or result in
some form of domestic violence. Id.
285. See supra pt. II(B) (discussing the development of the Enforcement Act’s
ambiguous language).
286. See Federal Intervention, supra n. 32, at 461 n. 165 (noting that “the clearer the
statutory terms, the less opportunity there is for a President to mask a crucial political
decision behind the obscurity of the statute.”).
287. See Statement of Kit Bond, supra n. 243 (arguing that “[u]nder the [Insurrection
Act], the President can invoke the act and declare martial law in cases where public order
breaks down as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, terrorist attack, or—very
ambiguously—‘other conditions.’”).
288. See Bybee, supra n. 45, at 4 (discussing the assertion that the Enforcement Act
was instituted as a power grab by the Executive Branch).
289. Banks, supra n. 43, at 77.
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Act goes well beyond the intended jurisdictional friction that has
historically arisen between state and federal governments when
responding to domestic emergencies.290 The congressional members also failed to address the fact that the term “or other
condition” made the Enforcement Act just as, if not more, indefinite than the Insurrection Act. Finally, as noted by Professor
Banks, “[w]e should be skeptical of the claim by a Senator that
Congress’[ ] legislative handiwork is ‘purposefully ambiguous.’”291
More importantly, these champions of uncertainty appear to
make no mention of the loss of life and property damage that
occurs while this consultation takes place.292
While coordination and collaboration among the key players
during a domestic emergency is important, it can be accomplished
by means other than creating and maintaining an intentionally
ambiguous statute. For example, creating pre-established guidelines and procedures between the President and governors for
requesting and deploying federal troops, discussed below, will go
a long way to ensure that the President and state governors work
together.
Additionally, one minor shortcoming of the Enforcement Act
was that, for the most part, it only modified Section 333 of the
Insurrection Act. The Enforcement Act should have taken a more
expansive view and examined other sections of the Insurrection
Act. For example, replacing the term “militia” with the term
“National Guard” would improve not only Section 333, but also
Section 331. The term “militia,” as understood today, is far
removed from its eighteenth-century meaning and has virtually
disappeared from most other statutes.293 Moreover, using the term
“National Guard” throughout the statute, as opposed to “militia,”
decreases the likelihood that state governments will lose control
of their SDFs even when requesting federal military assistance.
290. See supra pt. II(B) (discussing the legislative history and evolution of language
that contributed to the development of the Insurrection Act).
291. Banks, supra n. 43, at 77.
292. See e.g. David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 879, 879, 886 (1996) (discussing United
States citizens’ right to bear arms and the potential impact that right can have in the
event that, for instance, “armed citizens . . . stage a revolution.”).
293. See Wiener, supra n. 122, at 210 (noting that “the word ‘militia’ has virtually disappeared from the statute books”); Williams, supra n. 292, at 887–888 (discussing how the
militia was viewed during the eighteenth century).
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Finally, if the Enforcement Act took a broader view of the
Insurrection Act, rather than focusing only on Section 333, it
probably would have corrected the minor inconsistent language in
Section 331. As previously discussed, a literal reading of Section
331 may lead one to believe that the President may only use the
militia of outside states, and not the militia of the state in which
the domestic emergency actually occurs.294
B. Procedure to Request Troops
The Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century should
also create a uniform process by which governors request federal
military assistance under Section 331. Creating guidelines will
not only eliminate some of the uncertainty surrounding the
Insurrection Act, but also improve the relationship between the
President and state governors. As demonstrated throughout history, considerable confusion has surrounded the Insurrection
Act.295 For example, during the labor unrest of the early twentieth
century, President Theodore Roosevelt asked Secretary of War
Elihu Root to explain “the steps that would be necessary before
the federal government could take further action” by sending federal troops to Governor Sparks of Nevada.296 Other Presidents,
such as Woodrow Wilson,297 Franklin Roosevelt,298 and Lyndon
Johnson, issued written procedures or guidelines on how states
should request federal military assistance.299
294. Bybee, supra n. 45, at 4. Professor Bybee notes that when discussing the Militia
and Domestic Violence clauses, “James Madison . . . explained that states could use the
militia to suppress insurrections and quell riots [locally,] and then call on the federal government to aid them if necessary.” Id. at 37. Professor Bybee also notes that John
Marshall agreed with this interpretation, because “despite Congress’[ ] grant of power to
use and control the militia, the Constitution did not disable the states’ power over the
militia.” Id. at 37 n. 234.
295. See Patton, supra n. 273 (providing a historical prospective demonstrating confusion over the Insurrection Act).
296. Rich, supra n. 21, at 130.
297. See Laurie & Cole, supra n. 1, at 328 n. 4 (noting that President Woodrow Wilson
issued Weekly Intelligence Summaries in connection with “[a]rmy contingency plans for
dealing with a leftist-radical insurrection”).
298. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Proclamation by the President of the United States in
Robert Shogan & Tom Craig, The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in Violence 153–154 (Chilton
Books 1964).
299. Rich, supra n. 21, at 153–154. For example, President Lyndon Johnson’s written
instructions resulted in Attorney General Ramsey Clark’s letter to the nation’s governors,
a copy of which is reproduced infra. at Appendix 2. Cases and Materials on Terrorism:
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Unfortunately, the guidelines drafted by earlier Presidents
were reactive, as opposed to proactive. Furthermore, these guidelines were never codified.300 Thus, each subsequent generation
appears to have forgotten what the previous one learned.301 This
Article suggests codifying the guidelines in either the Insurrection Act itself or the Code of Federal Regulations to ensure that
both governors and Presidents are more aware of what to expect
and what is required to deploy troops domestically. Codification
will also, hopefully, reduce the last-minute scrambling normally
associated with requests under Section 331.302
Creating guidelines will probably appeal to the Executive
Branch because guidelines provide a way to decrease the likelihood of governors making recommendations for federal troops as
opposed to requests. The distinction between a “recommendation”
and a “request” for federal military assistance is important for
two reasons. First, some legal scholars, like Professor Banks,
argue that absent exceptional circumstances, a state must
“request” federal assistance before troops may be deployed to
combat domestic violence.303 Second, requiring that the governor
or legislature make formal requests diminishes the possibility
that the same governor or legislature will later either criticize the
President’s use of federal troops or hinder those troops’ deployThree Nations’ Response 434–435 (Michael F. Noone & Yonah Alexander eds., Kluwer Law
Intl. 1997).
300. Broad regulations exist within the Code of Federal Regulations that discuss the
employing military resources during civil disturbances. 32 C.F.R. §§ 215.1–215.10 (2009).
But these regulations do not reach the governor’s request for federal military assistance,
and instead defer to Section 331 on such matters. Id. at § 215.9(a)(2).
301. This was painfully evident in the Detroit Riot of 1967, which occurred twenty-four
years after an earlier Detroit race riot during which the President also invoked the Insurrection Act. Sidney Fine, Violence in the Model City 2 (U. of Mich. Press 1989). Fine notes
that:
Following the [Detroit Riot of 1943], the War Department provided its commands
and state governors with a memorandum regarding the legal prerequisites for the
use of federal troops in a civil disorder. . . . [T]he secretary of war and the attorney
general prepared a second memorandum specifically for the President that “succinctly” advised him of the law on the subject. No one in a responsible position in
Washington or Lansing appeared to be aware of the existence of either of these
memoranda when the need for federal troops became apparent during the Detroit
[R]iot of 1967.
Id.
302. See supra pt. III(B) (discussing some beneficial changes brought by the Enforcement Act).
303. Banks, supra n. 43, at 67.
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ment.304 This, in turn, makes for a better working relationship
among state and federal elected officials.
States may also favor codified guidelines due to the numerous
historical examples of the President, especially when convenient,
finding the request by the governor technically deficient or lacking sufficient information to allow for federal troop deployment.305
Creating guidelines will decrease this practice because under the
Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century, the governor will
know beforehand exactly what is required to receive federal
troops.
C. Involving the Courts
The first two recommendations primarily focus on reducing
the ambiguity associated with the Insurrection Act and, to a
lesser extent, on improving the working relationship between the
governor and the President. This last recommendation concentrates on the more elusive topic of public opinion and its influence
on the Insurrection Act. At the outset, this Article recognizes that
public opinion has both a negative and positive impact on the
Insurrection Act. In a democracy, public opinion is beneficial
because it increases the likelihood that the military, whether
deployed pursuant to the Insurrection Act or some other authority, will be used properly.306 This is due to the fact that those who
either request or deploy the military are publicly accountable
elected officials.
However, this accountability to the electorate has also caused
some leaders to either hesitate or refuse to use the military
despite an obvious need. For example, during Hurricane Katrina,
the President—although possessing the legal authority—did not
invoke Section 333 of the Insurrection Act because, at least
according to media reports, he feared the public backlash asso304. Riot Control, supra n. 21, at 642–643.
305. Rich, supra n. 21, at 191–192 (providing that “[t]wo standard excuses have been
used by [P]residents who have wished to avoid sending troops to states requesting aid. . . .
[The] second common method of avoiding the sending of troops is the excuse that the governor’s requisition is incorrectly drawn.”).
306. See Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and the Legal
Alternatives, 81 Geo. L.J. 773, 821 (1993) (noting that “a permanent [United Nations] army
would not be subject to the same restraining influence that is exerted by public opinion on
the military forces of individual member[ ] nations.”).
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ciated with a male President taking command and control away
from a female, southern governor of the opposite political party.307
Thus the question becomes: is there a way to both maintain the
positive influences of public opinion on the Insurrection Act while
also reducing the negative influences? There is, and this Article
suggests that the answer lies with the judiciary. As in the original
Calling Forth Act of 1792, this Article argues that the courts
should have a role with respect to the Insurrection Act.308
As discussed above, when the President wanted to call out
the militia to execute the laws of the Union under the Calling
Forth Act, he had to first obtain a judicial determination that
United States laws were opposed or obstructed “by combinations
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.”309 This requirement was originally added to the
Calling Forth Act to serve as a potential procedural safeguard
against the President abusing his authority under the statute.310
Today, this same requirement could be used to reduce negative
public opinion when the President invokes the Insurrection Act.
Requiring judicial involvement before deploying federal
troops domestically would, if nothing else, add legitimacy to an
action undertaken pursuant to the Insurrection Act because the
judiciary is generally the most-respected, and least-politicized,
branch of government.311 Thus, any decision to use or request
troops in response to a judicial determination that the laws are
being obstructed would probably be viewed as more legal than
political. For example, successfully strengthening public support
for the use of military force to quell the Whiskey Rebellion may
have been one reason why President Washington thought it
important to request a judicial determination from Associate Jus-

307. Lipton, Schmitt & Shanker, supra n. 30, at [¶ 8]; see also Burns, supra n. 37 (stating: “Presidents have long been reluctant to deploy troops domestically, leery of the image
of federal troops patrolling in their own country or of embarrassing state and local officials.”).
308. Professor Gardina has made a similar recommendation. Gardina, supra n. 40, at
1075.
309. 1 Stat. at 264.
310. See supra pt. II(B) (discussing the negative aspects of the Calling Forth Act).
311. Because Supreme Court Justices are appointed rather than elected, and because
neither their job security nor income depend directly upon public opinion, U.S. Const. Art.
III, § 1, it is widely believed that the Judiciary Branch is not susceptible to the same political pressure, accountability, and influence as the other two branches of government.
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tice Wilson before moving forward, even though judicial input was
unnecessary at the time.312
Assuming that the state governor or President follows a
course of action not at odds with that of the judiciary, involving a
second branch of government in determining whether to invoke
the Insurrection Act may also decrease the pressure of public
opinion on both governors and Presidents. For example, if the
judiciary determined that the laws in New Orleans were indeed
opposed or obstructed during Hurricane Katrina, then President
Bush may have felt more disposed to federalize the Louisiana
National Guard because he knew his actions were, for the most
part, supported by another branch of government. A judicial
determination may have also provided Governor Blanco with the
necessary cover to accept federal assistance by relinquishing
command of the Louisiana National Guard without appearing
weak or attempting to make a political point. In sum, a judicial
determination would have given both Governor Blanco and President Bush less cause to worry about public opinion because their
actions would be consistent with, and ratified by, the highly
regarded Judicial Branch.
Obviously, there will be potential issues associated with
reinstating the judicial determination. The first is one of practicality. For example, incorporating the judiciary into the
Insurrection Act might slow down the process of deploying troops
in the age of fast-hitting disasters and surprise attacks.313 Generally speaking, adding another decisionmaker to any process has
the potential to slow it down. But with advancements in communication, the judicial determination could occur before, during, or
after the state governor’s request for federal military assistance.
This determination by the Court, unlike during the Whiskey
Rebellion when it took Associate Justice Wilson two days to get
his report to President Washington, could now be transmitted to
the President in seconds.
312. Pursuant to the Calling Forth Act, a judicial determination was unnecessary
because President Washington was using the military not only to enforce the laws, but also
to put down an actual insurrection. Louis Fisher, The War Power: Original and Contemporary 12 (Am. Historical Assn. 2009). Public support for the President’s decision was
demonstrated by the large number of individuals who volunteered to fight the insurgents.
See generally Brackenridge, supra n. 100 (discussing the need for federal assistance to deal
with civil unrest).
313. Banks, supra n. 43, at 61.
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As for the other practical concerns raised, natural disasters
are no more fast-moving today than they were two hundred years
ago, nor are surprise attacks a relatively new phenomenon.314
Also, as with the Calling Forth Act, the judicial determination
requirement would be limited to instances where the military is
called to ensure the proper execution of the laws of the Union.315
Thus, a judicial determination would not be required if the military is deployed in response to an insurrection or invasion.
The bigger obstacle with reinstating the judicial determination will most likely center on the Court’s general reluctance to
either interfere with the President’s Commander-in-Chief
power,316 or involve itself in potential political questions.317 As
stated by numerous legal commentators, “a decision by the coordinate executive branch to employ the military to suppress
violence is a classic illustration of a ‘political question.’”318 In both
Luther and Martin, the Court found that “the power of deciding
whether [an] exigency had arisen upon which the government of
the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the President.”319 But this is not to say that the President’s actions here
are beyond complete judicial review, as noted in Sterling v. Constantin.320
In Sterling, the Supreme Court granted deference to the governor of Texas when he declared martial law, but stated that this
discretion was neither absolute nor beyond the law.321 The Ster314. Id.
315. See Mazzone, Commandeerer, supra n. 15, at 309 (discussing the first congressional authorization for federal use of the militia).
316. See Gardina, supra n. 40, at 1064 (noting that “[t]he statute’s ambiguous language
is compounded by the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to reviewing the President’s
decision to employ the military domestically.”).
317. Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases under the Guarantee Clause Should be Justiciable, 65
U. Colo. L. Rev. 849, 852–853 (1994) (providing that “[t]he political question doctrine is the
principle that certain allegations of constitutional violations are not to be adjudicated by
the federal judiciary even though all of the jurisdictional and other justiciability requirements are met.”).
318. Federal Intervention, supra n. 32, at 452.
319. Luther, 48 U.S. at 43; Martin, 25 U.S. at 30 (stating that “the authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen[ ] belongs exclusively to the President.”).
320. 287 U.S. 378, 402–403 (1932) (declining to review the actions of the President); but
see Federal Intervention, supra n. 32, at 453 (noting that “in recent years the judicial
deference in matters relating to ‘political questions’ has significantly diminished and it is
perhaps unwise to rely upon the assumption that the Court will maintain a strict handsoff policy with respect to those matters reaming within this category.”).
321. 287 U.S. at 401–404.
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ling decision generally stands for the proposition that “[e]ven
when ‘martial law’ is declared, as it often has been, its appropriateness is subject to judicial review.”322 Specifically, Chief
Justice Hughes stated: “If . . . the Executive [can] substitute military force for and [to] the exclusion of the laws . . . [then]
republican government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty
regulated by law. Martial law, established on such a basis,
destroys every guaranty of the Constitution. . . .”323 Thus, Sterling
offers the possibility of imposing some form of judicial review on
the President’s decision to deploy troops under the Insurrection
Act. Of course, Sterling involved a governor and not the President; however, the same general principles apply.
In light of Luther and Martin, Congress may be hesitant to
heavily rely on Sterling. Congress may also fear the possibility of
creating a potential constitutional crisis by giving the judiciary a
direct role in the Insurrection Act.324 Thus, an alternative to the
previous recommendation might be to give the courts a more indirect role. For example, Congress could modify the Calling Forth
Act’s language to make the judicial determination more discretionary than mandatory. In other words, the President could, but
would not be required to, obtain a judicial determination before
calling up the military under the Insurrection Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, there is a strong likelihood that American soldiers will be called to guard American streets in the near future.
In fact, a blue ribbon panel commission recently concluded that “it
is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be
used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of
2013.”325 As such, Congress should once again reexamine the
322. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 19 (1972) (summarizing Sterling, 287 U.S. at 401,
403–404).
323. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 402–403.
324. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63 Mont. L. Rev.
277 (2002) (explaining the criteria for determining a crisis in constitutional law by examining three different kinds of constitutional law crises—judicial, political, and
constitutional).
325. Commn. on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism, Preventing Terrorism: Assessing the Nation’s Progress, http://www.preventwmd
.gov/ (accessed Sept. 5, 2010); see also Bob Graham & Jim Talent, World at Risk: The
Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism xv (Vin-
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Insurrection Act to determine what changes need to be made to
bring this statute, which has remained relatively static for the
past 135 years, up-to-date in the twenty-first century.326 But,
unlike the events surrounding the Enforcement Act, this reexamination of the Insurrection Act should occur in public and
involve all major stakeholders, especially the state governors.
The areas of primary concern, as illustrated throughout this
Article, are: (1) clarifying the statute; (2) improving the working
relationship between state governors and the President; and
(3) reducing the negative impact of public opinion. These
improvements to the statute can best be accomplished by readopting most of the Enforcement Act, creating guidelines to request
federal military assistance, and reinstating judicial determinations.

tage Books 2008); MSNBC.com, Panel Warns Biological Attack Likely by 2013, http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/28006645 (updated Dec. 1, 2008) (discussing a panel’s recommendation
that President Barack Obama prepare for a biological attack that is likely to occur before
2013).
326. See Burns, supra n. 37 (commenting that “the Civil War-era Insurrection Act” and
PCA are “very archaic laws from a different era in [United States] history”).
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APPENDIX 1
Side-by-Side Comparison of the
Insurrection Act and the
Enforcement Act
(Amendments Bolded)
Insurrection Act of 1807
2 Stat. 443 (1807)

Enforcement of the Laws to
Restore Public Order Act
Pub L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083
(Oct. 17, 2006)

§ 333. Interference with State and Federal
law
The President, by using the militia or the
armed forces, or both, or by any other
means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any
insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the

laws of that State, and of the
United States within the State,
that any part or class of its people
is deprived of a right, privilege,
immunity, or protection named in
the Constitution and secured by
law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail,
or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that
protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution
of the laws of the United States or
impedes the course of justice
under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the
State shall be considered to have
denied the equal protection of the laws

§ 333. Major public emergencies;
interference with State and Federal
law

(a) USE OF ARMED FORCES
IN MAJOR PUBLIC
EMERGENCIES.—

(1) The President may

employ the armed forces,
including the National
Guard in Federal service,
to—

(A) restore public order and
enforce the laws of the
United States when, as a
result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other
serious public health
emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other
condition in any State or
possession of the United
States, the President
determines that—

(i) domestic violence has
occurred to such an
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extent that the constituted authorities of the
State or possession are
incapable of maintaining public order; and

(ii) such violence results in
a condition described
in paragraph (2); or

(B) suppress, in a State, any

insurrection, domestic
violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy if such
insurrection, violation,
combination, or conspiracy results in a condition
described in paragraph
(2).

(2) A condition described in

this paragraph is a condition that—

(A) so hinders the execution of

the laws of a State or possession, as applicable,
and of the United States
within that State or possession, that any part or
class of its people is
deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or
protection named in the
Constitution and secured by
law, and the constituted
authorities of that State or
possession are unable, fail,
or refuse to protect that
right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that
protection; or

(B) opposes or obstructs the

execution of the laws of the
United States or impedes
the course of justice under
those laws.

(3) In any situation covered by

paragraph (1)(B), the State
shall be considered to have
denied the equal protection of
the laws secured by the Con-
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stitution.

(b) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—
The President shall notify Congress of the determination to
exercise the authority in subsection (a)(1)(A) as soon as
practicable after the determination and every 14 days thereafter
during the duration of the exercise of the authority.
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APPENDIX 2
Attorney General Ramsey Clark made the following statements in a letter sent to all state governors on August 7, 1967:
There are three basic prerequisites to the use of Federal
troops in a state in the event of domestic violence:
(1) That a situation of serious “domestic violence”
exists within the state. While this conclusion
should be supported with a statement of factual
details to the extent feasible under the circumstances, there is no prescribed wording.
(2) That such violence cannot be brought under control by the law enforcement resources available
to the governor, including local and State police
forces and the National Guard. The judgment
required here is that there is a definite need for
the assistance of Federal troops, taking into
account the remaining time needed to move
them into action at the scene of violence.
(3) That the legislature or the governor requests
the President to employ the armed forces to
bring the violence under control. The element of
request by the governor of a State is essential if
the legislature cannot be convened. It may be
difficult in the context of urban rioting, such as
we have seen this summer, to convene the legislature.
These three elements should be expressed in a written communication to the President, which of course may be a
telegram, to support his issuance of a proclamation under 10
U.S.C. § 334 . . . and commitment of troops to action. In case
of extreme emergency, receipt of a written request will not
be prerequisite to Presidential action. However, since it
takes several hours to alert and move Federal troops, the
few minutes needed to write and dispatch a telegram are not
likely to cause any delay.
Upon receiving the request from a governor, the President, under the terms of the statute and the historic
practice, must exercise his own judgment as to whether Fed-
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eral troops will be sent, and as to such questions as timing,
size of the force, and federalization of the National Guard.
Preliminary steps, such as alerting the troops, can be
taken by the Federal government upon oral communications
and prior to the governor’s determination that the violence
cannot be brought under control without the aid of Federal
forces. Even such preliminary steps, however, represent a
most serious departure from our traditions of local responsibility for law enforcement. They should not be requested
until there is a substantial likelihood that the Federal forces
will be needed.

